1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 2 ALEXANDRIA DIVISION -----x 3 UNITED STATES, et al., : Civil Action No.: 4 1:23-cv-108 Plaintiffs, : 5 Friday, September 20, 2024 versus : Alexandria, Virginia 6 GOOGLE LLC, : Day 10 p.m. : Pages 1-165 7 Defendant. 8 The above-entitled bench trial was heard before the 9 Honorable Leonie M. Brinkema, United States District Judge. This proceeding commenced at 2:00 p.m. 10 A P P E A R A N C E S: 11 FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: GERARD MENE, ESQUIRE 12 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 2100 Jamieson Avenue 13 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 (703) 299-370014 JULIA TARVER WOOD, ESQUIRE 15 AARON TEITELBAUM, ESQUIRE MICHAEL WOLIN, ESQUIRE ALVIN CHU, ESQUIRE 16 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 17 ANTITRUST DIVISION 450 Fifth Street, NW 18 Washington, D.C. 20530 (202) 894-4266 19 BRENT NAKAMURA, ESQUIRE 20 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION 21 450 Golden Gate Avenue Room 10-0101 22 San Francisco, California 94102 (415) 205-3248 23 2.4 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES 25

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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 3 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Resumed) 4 BY MR. ISAACSON: 5 Good afternoon, Professor Lee. It's Bill Isaacson 6 again. 7 If you could, go to your white binder and go to the first exhibit, which was PTX 188. You discussed this in 8 9 your direct testimony at page 979. 10 Actually, let's start with the first page. This 11 is a 2014 document, right? This is a decade ago. 12 Α Excuse me? 13 This is a 2014 document? This is a decade ago? 14 Yes. 15 Okay. Turning to page 979 -- ,which had the elasticity 16 figures -- all right, and over on the left -- do you 17 remember reviewing this? 18 Yes. 19 Okay. So LPS, those are large publishers? 20 Α Yes. 21 And OPG, who are those? 22 Excuse me? 23 OPG, who are those? 24 Those are the other publishers. So LPS stands for top 25 100 to 200 publishers. OPG, Online Partnership Group, as I

1 recall it, refers to the rest of the publishers. 2 So that would be small and medium? 3 That's fair. 4 So if you flip forward to 982 -- so it's three more 5 pages -- there's a slide that says, "Price and product 6 feature sensitivity vary widely with client size suggesting 7 a segmented approach." And under "Large clients," it says, "Price not 8 9 among top factors." 10 For medium clients, it says, "Price is important." And for small clients, it says, "Price is a key 11 12 factor." 13 Do you know how to reconcile that with the 14 elasticity numbers for the OPG publishers on the previous 15 page? 16 Without spending time with the full document, I see 17 what that says. I'm not -- just sitting here, I haven't 18 reviewed it all. 19 Okay. And you don't know how the elasticity 20 calculations were done in this document, right? 21 I don't recall this presentation describing that. 22 Okay. And when an advertiser says that pricing is not 23 an important factor, one reason for that could be that the 24 advertiser is saying the return on investment on their ad is 25 more important than the take rate?

- 1 | A That could be a reason. I don't know for sure.
- 2 | Q Are you aware of any evidence that prices for AdX are
- 3 | inelastic for AdX if the ads are not delivering on the
- 4 return on investment the advertiser is seeking?
- 5 A Could you repeat your question, please.
- 6 | Q Sure. Are you aware of evidence showing that prices
- 7 | for AdX -- that is the take rates -- are inelastic if the
- 8 ads are not delivering on the return on investment the
- 9 advertiser is seeking?
- 10 A I don't follow your question. Elasticity refers to
- 11 characteristics of demand.
- 12 | Q All right. I'll move on then.
- 13 If we can, look at your opening report at
- 14 | paragraph 37 on page 9. I want to understand your statement
- 15 here.
- 16 ∥ A All right.
- 17 | Q This is from your introduction, right? Your summary?
- 18 **|** A Yes.
- 19 Q Okay. And you say at the bottom there on page 9, "I
- 20 then show that Google has used its market power in one
- 21 market to foreclose and diminish the competitiveness of
- 22 | rivals' products in another by" -- and then you turn the
- 23 page, and there's three bullet points.
- I just want to understand the markets that you're
- 25 referring to here.

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So Google Ads --

Cross-Examination - R. Lee

In the third one, "Providing dynamic allocation features and associated first and last look benefits exclusively to AdX within DFP, " that would be Google using what you call its market power in the ad server market to diminish the competitiveness in the ad exchange market. Do I have that right? Competitiveness of rivals in the ad exchange market, that's correct. Okay. And then moving up to the one above it, "Providing access to and use of real-time bids from AdX exclusively to DFP, " that would be Google using alleged market power in the ad exchange market to diminish the competitiveness of rivals in the publisher ad server market. Do I have that right? Yes. Okay. For the first one, "providing unrestricted access to Google Ads advertiser demand exclusively to AdX" -- the second market here is you're diminishing the competitiveness of rivals' markets in the ad exchange market, right? Could you repeat your question, please? In terms of -- so you have -- remember, you have a one-market and a two-market, right? So the second market for the first bullet would be the ad exchange market, right?

1 MS. WOOD: Objection. Vague. 2 MR. ISAACSON: I'm happy to rephrase it. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 BY MR. ISAACSON For the first item of conduct there, "providing 5 6 unrestricted access to Google Ads advertiser demand 7 exclusively to AdX," you are saying that diminishes the competitiveness of rivals' products in the ad exchange 8 9 market, correct? 10 Yes. 11 Okay. So when you are saying Google has used its 12 market power in one market to foreclose and diminish the 13 competitiveness of rivals' products at another, the second 14 market here is the ad exchange market? 15 The second -- my prior answer, I think, answered your 16 question. 17 Yeah. Okay. I think it did too, but I just want to 18 make sure we all understand. 19 All right. Now, the first part, "providing 20 unrestricted access to Google Ads' advertiser demand," 21 that's demand for ads, right? 22 I think that's fair. 23 All right. And I think we've established -- and you 24 agree -- that you've not defined a market in this case for 25 advertising?

- A I'm not opining on a relevant market where the products are the underlying advertisements.
- Q All right. Now, for your last piece of testimony yesterday, you talked about why you think Google's conduct harmed open-web publishers and advertisers, and you talked about three ways that happened.

Do you remember that testimony?

A Yes.

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- 9 Q So you say, first, by sustaining higher prices for
 10 transacting open-web displays. Higher prices would harm
 11 customers leading to lower publisher payouts or higher
 12 advertising prices.
 - You did not do any analysis to show that open-web displays that were -- ads that were transacted experienced any higher prices because of Google's conduct, correct?
- 16 A I wouldn't agree with that statement.
- Q You did not do -- you would agree you didn't do any quantitative analysis to suggest that open-web displays ads had higher prices, right?
 - A I've done quantitative analyses that supports this conclusion that Google's conduct sustained these higher take rates. AdX has charged, when there's more competition and limited circumstances, lower take rates.
 - Q Right. And so you understand I'm not talking about take rates now. I'm talking about the actual price of the

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Cross-Examination - R. Lee

1 advertisement. 2 Okay. You have not done any quantitative work 3 that would suggest that Google's conduct resulted in higher 4 ad prices? 5 So I've conducted analysis that supports the conclusion 6 that higher take rates do indeed lead to higher advertising 7 prices, and that's in my report. 8 You did not do any quantitative analysis to show that 9 that actually happened, that there was actually higher ad 10 prices because of higher take rates? 11 MS. WOOD: Objection. Asked and answered. 12 THE COURT: Do I understand your answer that you 13 assumed that the higher take rate would result in a higher 14 price? Your Honor, I used results from the 15 THE WITNESS: 16 2014 Google experiment, which implies the higher take rate 17 on Google Ads actually led to higher advertising prices. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 BY MR. ISAACSON: 20 Other that than that experiment a decade ago, did you 21 rely on -- did you rely on any quantitative information or 22 do your own quantitative analysis to show that higher take 23 rates would cause higher advertising prices? 24 That's the one I recall sitting here today.

Then you say, second, Google's conduct has reduced the

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Cross-Examination - R. Lee

quality of options that customers had to transact open-web displays ads likely reducing the efficiency of the 3 transactions that occurred. I think we've already covered that. This is where you say the conduct in this case --THE COURT: Well, since we've already covered it, you don't need to ask it again. MR. ISAACSON: Well, I just want to make sure he's talking about the same thing. 10 THE COURT: Let's move it along. 11 MR. ISAACSON: Okay. BY MR. ISAACSON: 12 13 Then, third, Google's conduct likely --14 Oh, in terms of the harms to publishers, when you 15 say there were harms to publishers from higher fees, you define "materially" -- you say there were materially higher 16 17 fees, right? 18 Are you pointing to a part of my report? 19 I can point you to your deposition. But when you say 20 there were higher take rates, okay, you say that they were 21 materially higher, right? If you don't, you don't. 22 Yes. 23 And the way you define "materially higher" is not de 24 minimis? 25 I use that language in my deposition. I recall that.

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I did say that.

Cross-Examination - R. Lee

And you have not attempted to quantify any losses to publishers from Google's conduct, right? So there are --THE COURT: The answer is yes or no. THE WITNESS: I believe I have conducted quantitative analyses that indicates publishers are harmed from higher take rates. BY MR. ISAACSON And did you quantify a number of what that harm is like some lower amount of money? I did not give a dollar number representing the exact amount of harm. And did you quantify a dollar effect on advertisers as a result of the conduct of Google? I did not give a specific dollar amount. And then you said, third, Google's conduct likely reduced innovation in the relevant markets. The -- and the reason you say Google's conduct affected innovation is because they had an adverse effect on rivals, right? I don't think that's an accurate characterization. Well, you say that Google's conduct reduced the benefits that its rivals could expect to gain from innovation?

1 And that's because its conduct impeded their ability to 2 compete, correct? 3 Yes. 4 All right. And so when you're talking about lower innovation, you're talking about if Google engages in 5 6 conduct that impairs a rival's ability to compete, your 7 opinion is that innovation goes down in the industry as a whole? 8 9 I can explain, but I don't think that's exactly what 10 I'm saying. 11 Okay. Have you done any analysis in any of your three 12 markets about the rates of innovation and had any opinions about how innovation is done in those markets? 13 14 I don't think I've done exactly how you're 15 characterizing that. 16 MR. ISAACSON: I will pass the witness. 17 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Wood. 18 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 19 BY MS. WOOD: Good afternoon, Professor Lee. I know it's been a long 20 21 I'll try not to take too much more of your time, but I 22 do have some questions. 23 You were asked a lot of questions on cross-examination about header bidding. Do you recall that? 24 25 I do recall that topic.

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

Okay. And header bidding was talked about increasing competition. Do you recall that? I recall that. And can you just tell us in what ways did header bidding increase competition? So one important way is that it allowed publishers to call upon multiple ad exchanges in real-time alongside one another. And so for a given impression, there was greater competition for that particular auction. And how do you as an economist distinguish, if at all, between competition in an ad auction and competition among market tools for open-web displays? Are those the same thing or different things? Well, they're different things. Can you explain that? Sure. So what we have to understand, like, within an auction, if you're comparing it against a waterfall, there is greater competition for that impression. But when you're thinking about the market, you're considering other factors as well. For example, it includes whether these other rival ad exchanges to AdX are actually able to submit competitive bids in an auction if they're facing off against AdX. So there are other considerations one would take into account when examining competition at the market level. And do you believe that header bidding cured the effect

1 of Google's anticompetitive conduct? 2 Not fully. It partly addressed some of the disadvantages from first look, but that led to last look. 3 4 And so there were some -- header bidding did increase 5 publisher yields relative to the former waterfall era with 6 first look, but it did not address all of the harms by any 7 means. 8 Now, do you recall being asked some questions about 9 your calculation of market share? 10 Yes. 11 And do you recall being asked, when you calculated 12 market share, whether your market share numbers did or did 13 not include transactions transacted through header bidding? 14 I don't recall that exact question, but it sounds like 15 it might have come up. 16 Okay. And can you describe to us how, if at all, your 17 market share calculations do or do not incorporate 18 transactions done through header bidding? 19 Sure. So if a header bidding transaction is won by an 20 ad exchange, then that's included in market share 21 calculations for ad exchanges. 22 Can you give us an example? 23 So if PubMatic wins an impression through a header 24 bidding wrapper, then that impression is still a transactor 25 served by PubMatic's ad exchange.

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Similarly, if a transaction is served by DFP but
comes from a header bidder, that impression is still
included when calculating publisher ad server market shares.
Q And to that extent, do your market share numbers for
each of the three relevant product markets include the added
competition, if any, associated with header bidding?
A Well, they reflect impressions transacted through
exchanges if they're coming through header bidding and if
they're not coming through header bidding.
Q Now, did you have occasion to observe what impact
header bidding had on AdX's supracompetitive take rate?
A I did observe that.
Q And what did you observe in that regard?
A That AdX maintained its average 20 percent take rate
through the period of my data.
Q So let's look at PTX 639. I think it should be in your
binder.
THE COURT: Are you moving this in? I'm not sure
if it's in yet or not.
THE WITNESS: Which binder?
THE COURT: 639.
MS. WOOD: I think it may be in, Your Honor, but
we will check.
THE COURT: Well, regardless, do you want it in?
MC WOOD: Yes we do We are moving DTY 639

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

Is there any objection to 639 if it's 1 THE COURT: 2 not in? 3 Mr. Isaacson, Plaintiffs' 639, it's in the small 4 white book. 5 It's already in. It's already in. 6 MS. WOOD: That's what I thought. 7 THE COURT: Okay. BY MS. WOOD: 8 9 And do you see here this is an exchange of comments 10 between two individuals, Chris LaSala and Jim Giles, both of 11 Google? 12 I see that. 13 And as of August of 2018, what was the status of header 14 bidding in the marketplace? 15 It has gained significant adoption. 16 Okay. And can you read the first sentence of 17 Mr. LaSala's comment where he addresses whether he's seeing 18 pressure or not on AdX's 20 percent at that time? 19 It says, "We are not seeing pressure on the AdX 20 20 percent, but I am making a statement that it is because 21 it provides nearly exclusive access to GDN demand." 22 And what, if anything, does that tell you about whether 23 header bidding was alleviating the competitive pressure of 24 rival exchanges to compete against AdX with their 20 percent 25 take rate?

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

To me this indicates that AdX market power had not been significantly eroded, at least to an extent that it did not reduce its 20 percent fee. Okay. Now, you were also asked some questions about Amazon as a competitive constraint. Do you recall that? Α Yes. Can you tell us: What Amazon products are available to transact open-web display transactions? So Amazon offers a DSP, and it also offers header bidding solutions. And if we could, look at PTX 1388. THE COURT: I don't think that's in my book. MR. ISAACSON: I don't have it either. MS. WOOD: I'll move on. THE COURT: All right. BY MS. WOOD Now, going back to the subject of header bidding, do you have -- can you describe to the Court -- you indicated earlier that header bidding was not included in the product market. Do you recall that? Yes. And it was not included in the product market for any of the three products that you opined upon in this case; is that right?

A Yes.

Q So can a product like header bidding pose a competitive threat even though it's outside the relevant product market?

A It's possible. It can, as I mentioned with regards to header bidding, enable an ad exchange or some other ad tech player, maybe a nascent publisher ad server, to grow into a more effective competitor within a relevant product market.

Q And can you describe how that happens?

A Well, for example, header bidding -- if publishers started relying upon header bidding wrapper solutions on their page to manage multiple exchanges and then that header bidding tool perhaps added functionality, like direct deal serving, starting to replicate some of the features of the publisher ad servers, then it's possible that DFP publisher ad servers would be disintermediated and publishers could be more reliant on header bidding instead.

This was a path that was actually outlined back in Google documents talking about yield managers where they were worried that yield managers were beginning to own the remnant tag that publishers might be calling yield managers to manage all of these indirect transactions thereby cutting out the publisher ad server for AdX.

And so that's a manner in which header bidding working alongside other demand sources could pose a competitive threat to the products in the relevant product

1	markets.
2	Q So in that sense, would you consider header bidding to
3	be a complement or a substitute to the products that are in
4	your three relevant product markets?
5	A In the way I've described, it is used alongside those
6	products. So it's complementary in the features that it
7	provides.
8	MS. WOOD: Okay. I think we have found our copies
9	of PTX 1388, Your Honor. This is from Professor Lee's
10	report.
11	Do you have a copy of that?
12	And if we can, put that up on the screen. Thank
13	you.
14	BY MS. WOOD
15	Q We were talking about Amazon and whether Amazon posed a
16	competitive threat, and what does PTX 1388 show in that
17	regard?
18	A Am I able to so the things are redacted, right?
19	Q Yes, the names are redacted. If you can, without
20	saying what color is what and the Court can view for the
21	Court's own purposes
22	THE COURT: All right. You have a 1388A?
23	MS. WOOD: We do have a 1388A, and then the Court
24	should be looking at 1388 in its unredacted form with the
25	hoves around the material that's redacted

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1	THE COURT: Right.
2	MS. WOOD: So what's being shown to the public is
3	1388A.
4	THE COURT: I can't tell it's too late in the
5	day whether it's in or not, but I assume it's being moved
6	in.
7	Any objection, Mr. Isaacson?
8	MR. ISAACSON: No objection.
9	THE COURT: All right. It's in.
10	BY MS. WOOD
11	Q Okay. Now, without referring to names or colors, can
12	you tell us how, if at all, you considered in PTX 1388 the
13	competitiveness or the competitive constraint of Amazon's
14	ad tech tools?
15	A So Amazon's DSP is contained in this chart and is much
16	smaller than Google Ads. I describe why DSPs are not a
17	competitive constraint or significant enough to constrain a
18	hypothetical monopolist of advertiser ad networks as well.
19	Q Okay. Now, you were also asked some questions do
20	you remember being asked questions about header bidding
21	being a nightmare scenario? Do you remember that?
22	A Yes.
23	Q Nightmare scenario, was that your term?
24	A I recall that language on this Google slide.
25	Q So that was Google's own term for header bidding,

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1	"nightmare scenario"?
2	THE COURT: We've heard that. We've heard
3	existential threat. All right?
4	BY MS. WOOD
5	Q Okay. So you also were asked some questions about
6	entry barriers and Facebook and Amazon. Do you recall that?
7	A I do.
8	Q And I believe you indicated in this regard that you
9	had it was your opinion that there were entry barriers
10	even for a company as large as Facebook, for example. Is
11	that right?
12	A That is correct. This is for the publisher ad server
13	market?
14	Q Yes.
15	A Yes.
16	MS. WOOD: And I'd like to offer now PTX 580.
17	THE COURT: Any objection to 580?
18	Is it not in the book?
19	MR. TEITELBAUM: We have one for the witness and
20	one for the Court. Opposing counsel should already have
21	theirs.
22	MR. ISAACSON: I don't.
23	THE COURT: All right. How many more of these
24	exhibits do we have? This seriatim is not going to work.
25	It's going to take too long. You should have them together.

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1	All right. Mr. Isaacson, any objection to 580?
2	MS. WOOD: This is cited in Dr. Lee's report.
3	MR. ISAACSON: Well, it's hearsay. It's a
4	Facebook document. So I don't mind it coming in to say it's
5	something he considered for his report. I don't know why it
6	would come in as evidence.
7	MS. WOOD: Well, Your Honor, Mr I believe this
8	is very similar to a document that came in directly through
9	Mr. Boland. It's just this version was cited in Professor
10	Lee's report; whereas the version that came in through
11	Mr. Boland had a different
12	THE COURT: All right. I'll let it in.
13	MS. WOOD: Okay.
14	BY MS. WOOD
15	Q Did you happen to be here when Mr. Boland testified,
16	Professor Lee?
17	A I don't believe so.
18	Q Okay. And PTX 580, do you recognize this as something
19	you cited in your report?
20	A Yes.
21	Q And do you recall, in connection with PTX 580, that
22	Facebook actually considered whether it could enter the
23	market for publisher ad servers and what would be involved
24	in that regard?
25	A Yes.

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

And if you can look -- sorry. Let me find the right page. Just one moment. So if you could look on the page ending -- and there are two Bates stamps at the bottom. But if you look at the most-bottom Bates stamp ending in 802. Yes. And do you see there is a reference to building ad tech as an option at the top of the page, work directly with publishers, build ad tech? Yes. And Facebook writes here, quote, We view this as an untenable strategy for Facebook at this moment in time. We should look to the LiveRail postmortem for analysis as to the difficulty of this strategy. But at a high level, the key points from that experience are: 1. Huge engineering investment to build competitive feature set to DFP for head of market publishers. 5- to 10-year road map to drive meaningful adoption. Ad tech is a services business and would 3. require a significant service org investment. Do you see that? I do.

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How, if at all, did those comments impact your views

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

about entry barriers to the publisher ad server market? Well, at least this document is consistent with there being significant barriers to entry and expansion that would take a long time and require a huge upfront cost. And how would you compare Facebook's relative readiness and resources to enter the market compared to the average other market participant who might want to enter a publisher ad server market? Facebook is a large firm, a very large firm, much larger than average. And how does Facebook's technological capabilities compare to other potential new entrants, if you know? Well, Facebook has integrated ad tech tools that it uses to sell advertisements on its own properties. already able to sell advertising, primarily social advertising, to advertisers. So in that sense, it already does have some advantage over firms who may not be in the business of selling advertising at all. Do you recall being asked questions about Okay. comparisons of win rates and take rates and share on an impression basis versus a revenue basis? I believe so. And can you explain to the Court: Why is it that you looked at certain data from an impression perspective as opposed to a revenue perspective?

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

1	A I think impressions are useful in that as ad tech tools
2	see more transactions, they are able to use that data to
3	better refine certain features of their products. For
4	example, determining how much to bid on a given action
5	auction, rather, and to optimize CPC to CPM bidding in the
6	case of Google Ads.
7	Q Now, do you recall being asked some questions about the
8	supracompetitiveness of DFP's take rates?
9	A Yes.
10	Q And did you do an examination of the
11	supracompetitiveness
12	MR. ISAACSON: I will object. This is outside the
13	scope of the cross. I did not inquire into anything about
14	the substance of DFP fees.
15	MS. WOOD: My recollection and I have it in my
16	notes was there were questions specifically discussing
17	whether he found DFP fees to be supracompetitive.
18	MR. ISAACSON: And I did not move on and ask him
19	any questions about it.
20	MS. WOOD: Your Honor, I believe he opened
21	THE COURT: But I think some of that data was in
22	some of those charts. I think it did come in. I'm going to
23	permit it.
24	I'm going to permit it, Mr. Isaacson.

MR. ISAACSON: Can I just say, Your Honor, there

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1	are no charts about DFP fees, none, zero. This would be
2	all the charts were about AdX.
3	MS. WOOD: Your Honor, I'd like to offer the chart
4	that reflects some DFP fees into evidence. It is PTX 1392,
5	and it comes directly from Professor Lee's report.
6	THE COURT: Yeah, but the question is was it
7	raised during the cross?
8	MS. WOOD: The question of DFP's fees was
9	absolutely raised on cross.
10	MR. ISAACSON: I asked no substantive questions
11	about it.
12	THE COURT: Well, it may not have been
13	substantive, but if it was raised in anything, I'm going to
14	permit it.
15	MS. WOOD: Do we have 1392 in the binder?
16	In any event, it's Figure 25 from Professor Lee's
17	report. It may also be in your binder.
18	THE WITNESS: What figure?
19	BY MS. WOOD
20	Q It is PTX 1392, and it is from your rebuttal report,
21	Figure 25.
22	THE COURT: Are you moving it in, or is it already
23	in?
24	MS. WOOD: Yes, we're moving it in, Your Honor.

- BY MS. WOOD
- 2 And do you recognize PTX 1392?
- 3 Α I do.

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- 4 And what is it?
- 5 It represents DFP's ad serving fees where they 6 collect -- you can see here over 2 cents per thousand units 7 served. This is on a worldwide basis, and it controls for

changes in publisher composition over time.

- 9 And what did this tell you about the competitiveness of 10 DFP's fees on a worldwide basis?
 - Well, it shows that it does charge positive fees. Other analyses that I've conducted indicate that over 90 percent of impressions come from publishers who pay ad serving fees in the U.S.
 - And then DFP collects data when publishers use DFP, and Google also collects fees from AdX and Google Ads that are transacted through DFP. So it obtains significant benefits from DFP customers.
 - And how does that influence your findings as to whether DFP has market power in the relevant market?
- 21 Well, to me, these fees are consistent with substantial 22 market power given all the benefits that it realizes from 23 the use of its product.
- 24 And I won't go into it again, but did you also talk 25 about quality degradations in DFP that you indicated was

1 indicative of market power? 2 I did. I discussed that in my direct testimony. 3 Now, you were shown some documents that showed Okay. 4 charts that AdX's relative share over time has gone up in 5 some years and has gone down in some years. Do you recall 6 that? 7 Α Yes. And what, if anything, does that tell you about whether 8 9 AdX possesses market power in the relevant product markets 10 in the relevant time period? 11 Well, as I mentioned before, market shares aren't the 12 complete story. One needs to look at -- well, I look at the 13 totality of evidence, including relative scale advantages, 14 reasons why AdX is meaningfully differentiated from other ad 15 exchange competitors, and direct evidence of Adx's market 16 power. AdX has kept a higher fee at 20 percent than the 17 weighted average take rate of its ad exchange rivals all the 18 while maintaining this relative scale advantage over time. 19 And you were also shown some differences between AdX's 20 market share when looked at on a revenue basis or a fee 21 basis -- no, a revenue basis versus an impression basis. Do 22 you recall that? 23 Yes. 24 And how does that impact your analysis of whether AdX 25 has monopoly or market power in the relevant markets.

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

A So, again, I report market share metrics across a variety of measures. We talked about impressions and spending. I'm looking at all of this. The relative advantages of AdX over its rivals is still shown in those other metrics.

But as I mentioned before, impression shares are useful because it more directly goes to the data that's

But as I mentioned before, impression shares are useful because it more directly goes to the data that's collected on a transaction basis. AdX tends to serve -- let me actually just stop there.

- Q So you were also asked some questions about quality of impressions and high CPM impressions and low CPM impressions. Do you recall that?
- A Yes.

- Q And can you describe any market competitive impact to an ad tech tool provider being able to provide smaller advertiser and low CPM advertising demand?
- A Yes. So Google Ads transacts a wide range of advertising within open-web display advertising from different ranges of costs. So retargeting, remarketing is generally seen as higher CPM advertising, but Google Ads buys a lot more than just retargeting ads.

And for publishers and advertisers who transact these lower-value CPM impressions, that's still important to them if they're not selling or transacting remarketing impressions, for example.

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

So AdX, they face -- I think I described this before -- no competition in this GAM log-level data for almost two-thirds of the transactions it wins. And many of the transactions AdX serves might be lower CPM than other exchanges. It actually has a lower CPM on average than other competitors. But those lower CPMs -- if they don't face competition, those customers seeking to transact them would be harmed if they don't have access to AdX. In the auction removal analysis of AdX, I found that, although, on average AdX had a 28 percent change in publisher revenues if it was removed from the auctions, they didn't pick as much bigger for the smaller publishers. Those publishers at the smallest range that I looked at see a payout reduction of over 60 percent when they lose access to AdX. And that's partly due to the fact that AdX is transacting those kinds of impressions of those smaller publishers' path. And do you have an understanding, based on your review

Q And do you have an understanding, based on your review of the evidence, of how small publishers -- let's say, a local newspaper like *The Staunton News Leader* -- might value smaller advertisers who only -- who pay lower CPMs relative to Proctors & Gambles of the world?

A Well, I've seen documents that talk about the value of local advertisers for local businesses, and this is one of the strengths that Google Ads brings, this set of

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

advertisers who would be valued by these small or medium businesses. So even though the CPMs are lower, they still bring value to publishers and perhaps meaningful differentiation from larger advertisers? I think that's fair. Okay. And, again, you were shown a lot of different charts slicing and dicing AdX's market shares a bunch of different ways. In any of those charts, did you see any competitor to AdX who had a meaningful market share relative to AdX's market share? As I mentioned, AdX had a nine times greater market share based on impressions worldwide and five times greater based on the U.S. in '22. THE COURT: But the answer was no? THE WITNESS: Sorry. No. BY MS. WOOD And you were also asked some questions -- you were shown several charts looking at social media ad spending and ad spending on Amazon owned and operated and ad spending on apps and ad spending on connected TV. Do you recall that? Yes. And can you describe how those relative ad spending in those categories outside the product market influence your views of Google's market power in the relevant product

1	markets?
2	A Well, although spending in those other markets are
3	growing, from the evidence I've seen, Google still maintains
4	substantial and sustained market power over these products
5	used to transact open-web displays.
6	Q Do you recall being asked some documents asked
7	questions about whether you'd seen documents reporting
8	market share for open-web displays?
9	A I recall those questions.
10	Q And I'd like to put in front of you a document already
11	admitted in evidence as PTX 1709, and there should be a
12	redacted version in your binder.
13	MR. ISAACSON: Are you saying he cited this
14	document? We don't have a record that he cited this
15	document.
16	MS. WOOD: Well, let's see.
17	THE COURT: Is 1709 in
18	MS. WOOD: 1709 oh, sorry.
19	THE COURT: evidence?
20	All right. It's already in evidence. She can ask
21	him about it.
22	BY MS. WOOD
23	Q If you look at the bottom of PTX 1709, does this
24	reflect one market participant discussing market share
25	percentages in categories that are familiar to you?

1 You don't have to answer what the categories are, 2 please. 3 Yes. 4 Okay. And do you recall looking at -- being asked 5 questions about AdX's 20 percent take rate and whether it 6 was a supracompetitive take rate or not? 7 Α Yes. 8 Did you review evidence from Google's own employees 9 discussing whether AdX's -- how AdX's take rate compared to 10 the competition? 11 Yes. Α 12 And if we can, look at PTX 712. 13 MR. ISAACSON: This is in evidence, Your Honor, 14 but he's just saying he's reviewed documents on this topic. 15 He did not review this document. This is not something he 16 cited. 17 Well, remember, the doctor has THE COURT: 18 testified that he didn't necessarily cite everything that he 19 had reviewed, right. MR. ISAACSON: Well, I mean, it's also not in his 20 list of exhibits attached that he --21 22 THE COURT: But, again, the report was long enough 23 as it was. 24 But in any case, this is becoming, again, quite

Is this something new here?

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redundant.

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

MS. WOOD: No. I'll move on, Your Honor.

2	BY MS. WOOD
3	Q Now, when you were talking about can we pull up PTX
4	1280, which you were shown on cross-examination.
5	And in PTX 1280, we went through some of the take
6	rates for the various firms and for AdX; is that right?
7	A Yes.
8	Q And what is in the far right column of PTX 1280?
9	A That represents their share of impressions.
10	Q So let's take, for example, Firm K that's charging in
11	various years between 37, 29, 38 percent. What is its share
12	of the ad exchange market?
13	A 1 percent.
14	Q And what, if anything, does that tell you about the
15	relative market power of Firm K versus AdX?
16	A Again, market shares are an imperfect indicator of
17	market power. One wants to consider everything else, but
18	there's a big relative scale difference between the two
19	exchanges.
20	MS. WOOD: Okay. We can take that down now.
21	BY MS. WOOD
22	Q You were also shown a bunch of documents talking about
23	the June 2023 GAM-level data, and there was some discussion
24	about open bidding data being even included in that.
25	Can you explain what open bidding data was in the

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

June 2023 GAM log-level data and how you used that? So the GAM log-level data represents all the auctions run through GAM, and open bidding is a set of exchanges that are going through Google's open bidding program into that auction. And you were also asked some questions about whether a DFP publisher can make impressions available on Amazon or Prebid or other ad exchanges. Do you recall that? Α Yes. And how, if at all, is the possibility of a DFP publisher making impressions available on Amazon Prebid or other ad exchanges serve as a competitive constraint on DFP? Α Not directly. And can you explain why not? Well, this is about what a DFP customer, an open-web publisher, can do with regards to other exchanges and demand sources. It's not speaking that publisher's ability to substitute a way to another publisher ad server if DFP exercised market power. Why not? Why couldn't a DFP publisher just use header bidding wrappers or Amazon or other ad exchanges and forgo DFP altogether? This goes to one of the important features of a publisher ad server, its ability to manage both directly sold and indirectly sold open-web displays ads. And those

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

- 1 | other products don't offer all of those features.
- 2 | Q Now, you were asked some questions about UPR. Do you
- 3 ∥ recall that?
- 4 A Yes.
- 5 | Q And you were shown one paragraph from your report with
- 6 a couple of footnotes that dated to documents from 2019. Do
- 7 you recall that?
- 8 A Yes.
- 9 Q Does your report go on to discuss additional material
- 10 | about publishers' reaction to UPR?
- If you can, look at pages 290 to 293 of your
- 12 report.
- 13 | A There's additional discussion there.
- 14 | Q Okay. You were also asked -- you were shown PTX
- 15 | 1281 -- oh, sorry -- 1269.
- 16 A In the black binder or the white binder?
- 17 | Q I believe the black binder, but it's up on the screen.
- 18 Do you see PTX 1269?
- 19 **|** A I do.
- 20 Q And do you see you were asked some questions about
- 21 | Firm S.? Do you recall that?
- 22 | A Yes.
- 23 | Q And, again, without naming Firm S, can you tell us how
- 24 | large is Firm S as a market participant?
- 25 | A I recall it's six times smaller based on impressions

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

1 than Google Ads. 2 Okay. And so when you looked in PTX 1281 -- I believe it was 1281 -- at Firm S's take rates, how does, again, 3 4 Firm S act as a competitive constraint, based on your 5 opinion, against Google Ads? 6 Well, based on all the evidence I've seen, it's not 7 significant enough to constrain Google Ads's exercise of substantial market power. 8 9 And other than their relative size, can you describe 10 whether there are other characteristics of Firm S -- and we 11 should be careful about saying specific characteristics. 12 But are there other characteristics of Firm S that 13 distinguish it from Google Ads? 14 So I think this came up a little bit before, but Firm S 15 specializes on a subset of impression types, and Google Ads 16 transact those, as well as a broader set of impressions as 17 well. 18 And do you know whether there are pricing differences 19 between that subset of ads and the broader array of ads that 20 AdX transacts? 21 Yes. 22 And can you describe the pricing differences? 23 For example, when Google Ads bids on this set of impressions through other exchanges, it's a much higher take 24 25 rate.

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

Now, there was some discussion about sharing Okay. customers. Do you remember that? Yes. As an economist, do you believe that Google owns its customers? No. Why not? 0 Well, the language is not something that I would use. Customers oftentimes choose the products that they wish to consume, those that best serve their needs. And from an economic perspective, you talked about conditioning access to one product based on the use of another product; is that right? That's right. And is that, in general terms, how economists think of what we lawyers might call a tie? It's one way of describing an economics tie. Okay. So from an economic perspective, not from a legal perspective, what is wrong with conditioning access in the way we just discussed, if anything? Well, as a matter of economics, conditioning access, tying access can be anticompetitive. It can harm the ability of competitors to compete for business impairing their ability to attract customers, thereby enhancing market power.

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Redirect Examination - R. Lee

And is economics at all concerned with customers' 1 2 ability to have freedom of choice? 3 Well, I think customers choosing the product that best 4 fits their need is a feature of competition, which generally 5 leads to better products and welfare. 6 Now, I want to ask you about the pricing of ads and 7 take rates in terms of harm to publishers and advertisers, 8 and I just want to make sure I understand how take rates 9 work. 10 When an advertiser pays a dollar for an ad 11 impression, how much of that dollar -- if the transaction --12 let's just talk about AdX -- goes through Google Ads makes 13 its way to the publisher? 14 Sorry. Can you repeat your question? 15 Sure. 16 AdX's take rate is 20 percent, right? 17 Α Yes. 18 Roughly? 19 (Nods head up and down.) 20 And for every dollar the advertiser pays, how much 21 money makes it to the publisher if all -- if the only fee 22 we're looking at is AdX? 23 If only AdX, it would 80 cents, a dollar minus 24 20 percent. 25 And assume a hypothetical world where AdX's take

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Recross-Examination - R. Lee

rate was 10 percent, not 20 percent. The advertiser pays the same dollar. How much goes to the publisher? In that example, it would be 90 cents. And how, if at all, does that difference between 80 percent going to the publisher and 90 percent going to the publisher impact the buying power of advertisers? It means a dollar that's spent by the advertiser, less of it goes to the publisher. So if it then competes against another bid, it's less competitive. And how, if at all, does that take rate impact what ultimately is received by publishers? Α It reduces. And how does that harm publishers and advertisers? Again, it harms publishers through a reduced payout. And in the example you gave, an advertiser using that tool with a higher take rate has a less competitive bid in a subsequent auction. MS. WOOD: I'll pass the witness. THE COURT: All right. RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. ISAACSON The PTX 580, the Facebook document you were shown that talked about --The barriers to entry?

-- about their decision at this moment in time, that

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Recross-Examination - R. Lee

1	was from February 2018, right?
2	A That was.
3	Q And then with respect to publisher ad server fees, with
4	respect to the DoubleClick for Publisher fees, you have said
5	before they've remained relatively constant?
6	A You saw that figure. There was variation. But just
7	sort of generally, they remained a little bit above 2 cents
8	per thousand.
9	Q And you do not know whether those fees have whether
10	those you didn't look at those fees on a quality-adjusted
11	basis, right?
12	A As we discussed before, my fee analysis was nominal,
13	not doing a quality
14	MR. ISAACSON: No further questions, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: That was a superb recross. The only
16	better was we had one where there was nothing.
17	Ms. Dunn, I think you won that one.
18	MS. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor.
19	THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Professor. You
20	may step down.
21	THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.
22	MS. WOOD: And, Your Honor, we will reserve the
23	right to call Professor Lee in rebuttal, if necessary.
24	THE COURT: Yes.
25	Professor, you've heard me say this before. Don't

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discuss your testimony with any witness who has not yet testified. THE WITNESS: Yes. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor, if it's all right, I think I'm going to take a second try at getting those four exhibits that we discussed yesterday in. I have conferred with Ms. Dunn. There is, in fact, no dispute between the parties. 10 THE COURT: Excellent. So what are they now? MR. TEITELBAUM: PTX 1092, PTX 1093, PTX 1096, and PTX 1099. These have been narrowed based on the agreement of the parties. So we will provide a replacement electronic 14 version to the Court, and I have a replacement hard copy 15 version, hole-punched, for now. THE COURT: That's fine. So just hand that up. 17 Okay. 18 Now, Ms. Wood, are you saying the magic words? MS. WOOD: We are going to say the magic words. The plaintiffs rest, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Very good. 22 All right. Ms. Dunn. MS. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor. Google calls 24 Scott Sheffer.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Sheffer.

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

1	You probably need some books, right?
2	MS. DUNN: Yes, Your Honor.
3	And I'd like to acknowledge my colleagues Jessica
4	Phillips and Anita Liu, who will be joining us at counsel
5	table.
6	THE COURT: All right. Ms. Dunn.
7	MS. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor.
8	SCOTT SHEFFER, DEFENDANT'S WITNESS, SWORN
9	DIRECT EXAMINATION
10	BY MS. DUNN
11	Q Good afternoon, Mr. Sheffer. Please introduce yourself
12	to the Court and spell your name for the court reporter.
13	A I'm Scott Sheffer. My last name is spelled
14	S-H-E-F-E-R.
15	THE COURT: Mr. Sheffer, I can already tell your
16	voice is kind of soft, and you're tall. So I think we're
17	going to give you the lapel mic; otherwise, you have to lean
18	over and speak in the mic. So just hold that up.
19	THE WITNESS: Is that better?
20	THE COURT: Much better.
21	MS. DUNN: Yeah, much better.
22	BY MS. DUNN
23	Q Mr. Sheffer, where do you work?
24	A At Google.
25	Q And what is your current role at Google?

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

- I am the vice president for global partnerships sell-side monetization. 3 And I'm just guessing here, but if you could move the 4 microphone up on your lapel or closer --Α Better? Keep talking. Α Testing. Testing. Yes? Q That okay. Great. What is your current role at Google? 10 I lead our sell-side monetization team. 11 And what is the sell-side monetization team at Google? 12 That's the team that works with our publisher, 13 developer, and other partners to implement and utilize our 14 sell-side monetization tools, ad tech, ad serving, and 15 monetization tools. 16 Okay. And please describe to the Court who you're 17 working with as part of your group broadly. 18 Sure. We work with publishers, developers, 19 broadcasters of all sizes around the world, from folks who 20 do weekend blogging all the way through large app 21 developers, large brand-name publishers, those sorts of 22 companies. 23 Okay. And how long have you worked at Google?
- 24 A little over 18 years.
 - And over the 18 years that you've spent at Google, have

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

you always worked with publishers or digital content 1 2 creators? 3 Yes. I have primarily focused on the sell-side of 4 business with publishers. 5 Okay. And although you just said that you work on the 6 sell-side primarily, are you also familiar with Google's 7 buy-side tools? 8 I am, yes. 9 And all right. And just -- we'll do a little bit of 10 background. Where did you go to college? 11 I got my bachelor's and master's at Penn State 12 University and my PhD at Princeton. 13 And what did you study? 14 Aerospace engineering was my field. 15 And when you were pursuing your focus -- your PhD in 16 aerospace engineering, what was your focus? 17 My research thesis was on using supercomputers to 18 simulate high-speed combusting supersonic flows in things 19 like jet engines. 20 All right. And --21 THE COURT: Don't ask anything more along those 22 lines. 23 MS. DUNN: That's okay. I'm out of my depth, Your

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Honor, with that.

- 1 BY MS. DUNN
- 2 | Q And what was your first position at Google?
- 3 A I was a manager in the AdSense online sales and
- 4 operations team.
- 5 | Q And at some point over your 18 years at Google, did
- 6 your role change?
- 7 | A It did. So I started leading more teams. I ended up
- 8 | leading our global AdSense online sales team in 2010. Then
- 9 I was promoted to vice president in 2013. And over the last
- 10 several years, I've taken on responsibility for all of our
- 11 | publisher-facing partner management teams.
- 12 | Q Okay. All right. Mr. Sheffer, you have worked on a
- 13 demonstrative as a way of communicating about the ad tech
- 14 | ecosystem; is that correct?
- 15 **|** A Yes.
- 16 Q And we are going to, with the Court's permission, put
- 17 | up the demonstrative on the screen, and we're going to build
- 18 | the plane as we are flying it, to quote an earlier sentence
- 19 \parallel in this trial.
- 20 All right. Mr. Sheffer --
- 21 MS. DUNN: If we could, put up the words "ad tech
- 22 | ecosystem" just at the top to orient.
- 23 BY MS. DUNN

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- 24 | Q -- what is the purpose of the ad tech ecosystem?
 - A So that ecosystem exists to connect advertisers or ad

1 buyers with publishers who are ad sellers in order to 2 connect messaging and advertisements with users. 3 And it's important that, as we build the 4 demonstrative, that it be done at your direction. So I'll 5 ask you to help direct Mr. Spalding about what to put on the 6 screen. 7 Right. So on the right-hand side of the screen, we 8 should put a little block that says "ad buyers," and on the left-hand side of the screen, we should put a little block 9 10 that says "ad sellers." Then we can draw connection between 11 ad sellers and ad buyers because, at least initially way 12 back when, ad buyers connected directly with the ad sellers 13 in order to place ads. 14 And the Court has heard a little bit about direct 15 deals. Is what you're describing direct deals? 16 That is correct, yes. 17 And do direct deals still happen today? 18 Absolutely. 19 All right. Moving to the tools in ad tech ecosystem, 20 what was the first tool available in Google's ad tech 21 ecosystem? 22 That would have been Google AdWords. 23 And where does AdWords go? 24 We can put that on the upper right-hand section.

Yep, that looks great.

Sure.

25

1 Okay. And please explain: What was AdWords? 2 AdWords was a tool that advertisers could use to place 3 ads on Google's search results page. 4 And do you have -- I don't know -- like a bubble for --Q 5 Sure. We should put a bubble on the left-hand side, 6 which would be Google's owned-and-operated search results 7 page, and then we should draw a connection between AdWords 8 and search owned and operated. 9 Okay. And when did Google launch AdWords? 10 2000. 11 All right. And at that time, did Google vet the 12 advertisers who used Google Ads to place advertisements on 13 Google's owned-and-operated properties? 14 Yes. 15 Okay. And did Google also develop at this point any 16 sell-side tools? 17 The sell-side tool that came very soon after was called 18 AdSense for Search. 19 Okay. Where does that go? 20 We shall put that sort of to the left under search 21 owned and operated. 22 Yeah, that looks great. 23 Okay. And what was AdSense for Search? 24 So AdSense for Search was a product that allowed 25 advertisers to place their ads on search results pages on

- 1 | third-party publishers.
- 2 | Q Okay. And what did it connect to?
- 3 A So it connected AdWords to AdSense for Search. So
- 4 | these were all third-party partners that had search engine
- 5 result pages.
- 6 | Q Okay. And I know that in this demonstrative we're
- 7 | going to draw at your direction various connections. What
- 8 | are the connections meant to convey?
- 9 A So these connections convey three things, primarily,
- 10 | that are flowing. It would be data or signals, money, and
- 11 then advertisements or messages.
- 12 Q Okay. What came next?
- 13 | A The next product that we should put up here is AdSense
- 14 \parallel for Content. And we can put that on the left-hand side,
- 15 | probably just below AdSense for Search.
- 16 | Q And what was AdSense for Content?
- 17 A AdSense for Content was another product that enabled
- 18 | advertisers to place ads on publisher websites against
- 19 content on those pages, so a typical page of website
- 20 content.
- 21 | Q Okay. And when you say "place ads against," what do
- 22 you mean by that?
- 23 | A Oh, that means that the ads would actually show up
- 24 | within the website on the page that the user was looking at.
- 25 | Q And what did AdSense for Content connect to?

- 1 AdSense for Content connected back to AdWords/Google 2
- 3 And to anything else?
- 4 At that point, that was it.
- 5 0 Okay.

Ads.

- 6 I'm sorry. We should connect AdSense for Content and
- 7 AdSense for Search to ad sellers because they were using
- 8 those products.
- Okay. And does AdWords and Google Ads connect, then, 9
- 10 to ad buyers?
- 11 That is correct, yes.
- 12 Okay. When was AdSense for Content developed?
- 13 It was 2003.
- 14 And why in 2003 did Google decide to develop AdSense
- 15 for Content?
- 16 A couple of reasons:
- 17 One, the web was starting to grow quite quickly.
- 18 Websites were proliferating. A lot of content was coming
- 19 online. So it was a great opportunity for advertisers to
- 20 reach those users on those content websites. However, the
- 21 other nice benefit here is that money flows to publishers,
- 22 which enables them to create more content, thus growing the
- 23 web. And it had also the benefit for Google that the search
- 24 engine became more and more useful to navigate across all
- 25 that content on the web. So it was a nice reinforcing

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

- circle. 1 2 You mentioned earlier that Google vetted the 3 advertisers who used AdWords. Did Google also vet the 4 publishers who used AdSense for Content? 5 Yes, we did. 6 And why did you do that? 7 For two main reasons: One is that we wanted advertisers to feel 8 9 comfortable with the content of the sites they were placing 10 ads against where their ads would show up. 11 Then, secondly, we wanted the publishers who were 12 joining AdSense for Content to feel like they were joining a 13 high-quality network. 14 Okay. And the Court has heard testimony in this case 15 about ad networks. 16 Yep. 17 When did ad networks come on the scene? 18 This was right about the same time. There are lots of 19 other ad networks that were in the ecosystem. So we can 20 put, like, a little block there for competitive ad networks
- 22 Q And what was -- did Google have an ad network?
 - A Our ad network was AdSense Research.

perhaps underneath AdSense for Content.

24 THE COURT: I'm sorry. What?

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25 THE WITNESS: AdSense -- oh, sorry. AdSense for

- 1 | Content. My apologies. We also called it the Google
- 2 | Display Network.
- 3 | BY MS. DUNN
- 4 | Q Is that sometimes call GDN or GCN?
- 5 A Correct, yes.
- 6 | Q All right. And I see that we had -- Mr. Spalding has
- 7 | put up the GDN bubble and the competitor ad networks bubble.
- 8 A Yes.
- 9 Q So if there are any other connections that need to be
- 10 drawn, will you please direct Mr. Spalding.
- 11 A Certainly. So I would connect ad buyers with
- 12 competitive ad networks because they bought on those
- 13 networks, and those networks then connected also to ad
- 14 | sellers.
- 15 Q Okay. And you mentioned competitor ad networks. First
- 16 of all, what did they do?
- 17 A They did a very similar concept to what AdSense for
- 18 Content did. They aggregated publisher ad inventory. They
- 19 went out to publishers and said, "Please give us your ad
- 20 | inventory." And they connected that with advertisers who
- 21 | wanted to place ads against those publisher websites as well
- 22 | with some sort of targeting technology that made the
- 23 connection between those ads and those users.
- 24 | Q How many competitor ad networks were there?
- 25 | A There were probably dozens at the time.

- 1 Okay. And are there still competitor ad networks in 2 the world? 3 Certainly, yes. 4 Okay. And have you ever heard the phrase "advertiser 5 ad networks"? 6 Not really, no. 7 Okay, and I neglected to ask you. Are there -- you 8 said there were still competitor ad networks today? 9 Α Yes. 10 Do you know how many off the top of your head? 11 There's probably dozens out there for sure. Yes. 12 There's multiple ones across all the types of inventory that 13 exist today. 14 Okay. All right. So what is -- after this, what 15 happened? What was the next step in the evolution of the ad tech ecosystem? 16 17 So the next two tools that Google had were DFP and the 18 ad exchange. We should place DFP sort of underneath AdSense 19 for Content and the ad exchange right next to DFP. 20 Okay. And before we do the connections, just to be 21 clear, how did DFP and AdX come to be? 22
- 22 A They were products that were purchased as part of
 23 DoubleClick acquisition, and then they were rebuilt and
- 24 enhanced on the Google technical infrastructure.

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Q Okay. And, Mr. Sheffer, if you could, direct

1 Mr. Spalding what connections need to be made. 2 Absolutely. This one is probably going to get a little 3 complicated. So let's start with DFP connecting to ad 4 sellers because that was the primary ad server that --5 sorry, the ad server is what ad sellers use. And then DFP 6 connects to AdX. It also connected to competitor ad 7 networks. It also connected to AdSense for Content. then DFP also connects directly to ad buyers in order to 8 9 facilitate the direct deals that we mentioned earlier. 10 Okay. And are there also competitor ad servers? 11 There are, yes. 12 Okay. And where would those go here? 13 I would just put a block underneath DFP for competitive 14 ad server. 15 That sound great, yes. 16 Okay. And can you direct Mr. Spalding to what, if any, 17 connections need to be made to competitor ad servers. 18 Sure. So, similarly, competitor ad servers would 19 connect to ad sellers. They could also connect to AdSense 20 for Content. They connect to competitor ad networks, and 21 they also connect to ad buyers for their direct sales 22 efforts. 23 And we'll try to just slow down a little and let 24 Mr. Spalding catch up with you.

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Sure.

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

So while we're here -- so we talked about competitor ad What about competitor ad exchanges? There were competitor ad exchanges as well. should put a block there somewhere, maybe below the ad exchange. Here, again, competitor exchanges would connect to competitor ad servers. They would also connect to DFP. the competitor ad exchanges would also connect to ad buyers. Okay. And the Court has already heard testimony about the acquisition of DFP and AdX. So I'm not going to go into that in great detail. And you testified a moment ago that they were rebuilt and enhanced on the Google technology platform. Correct. When did Google roll out AdX after it was rebuilt on Google's stack? Yeah, that was in 2009. Okay. And if you know, what revenue share did DoubleClick charge for its ad exchange before it was acquired by Google? It was an 80/20 rev share before the acquisition. Okay. And when you say 80/20 --Oh, sorry. Yes. So 80 percent of the revenue goes to the publisher, and 20 percent of the revenue is kept by Google.

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

Okay. And also, if you know, after the acquisition and after Google had rebuilt and enhanced the ad exchange, what take rate did Google apply? It was the same 80/20 rev share. So 80 percent to the publisher and 20 percent to Google. Okay. And to what extent, if at all, did Google take into consideration DoubleClick's 20 percent rev share for Adx? It was a market rate that we thought was appropriate, so we adopted it. Okay. And then over the years, at any time where Google gained customers on the buy-side, if you know, did Google decide to raise the 20 percent take rate for AdX? Not that I'm aware of. Okay. To what extent are publishers who use DFP part of GDN? So publishers who are on DFP, if they are utilizing the ad exchange functionality or AdSense for Content, their inventory would be considered part of the Google Display Network. All right. And we had just talked about --Oh, sorry. We're missing some connections as well that I didn't notice here. So we should have connections from AdWords Google Ads to AdX, from ad buyers to AdX, and competitive networks also bid on AdX as well.

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

- Q Okay. And how did advertisers bid into competitor exchanges?
 - A Primarily, they used tools which became known as DSPs.
 - Q Okay.

A So we can put a block on the right-hand side, perhaps in that space under AdWords Google Ads. Right. Maybe we can move it up a little bit to avoid some of the spaghetti that we're creating here.

Okay. That looks great, yeah.

Similarly, for this competitor DSPs would connect to ad buyers because they primarily use those to place advertisements across a bunch of different areas. So we need to connect competitor DSPs to competitor ad networks and competitor DSPs to ad exchange and competitor DSPs to competitor exchanges. And there are also some instances where competitor DSPs connect directly into ad servers, such as DFP and competitor ad servers.

- Q Okay. I'm just trying to keep up. All right. And does Google have its own DSP?
- A It does. It's now called DV360.
- 21 | Q Okay. And what exchanges does DV3 or DV360 bid into?
- A It bids into the ad exchange, as well as multiple
 different competitive exchanges, probably on the order of 80
 plus, I think at this point.
 - So we should probably put a block up here for

Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

DV360 sort of below -- yeah, below the competitor ad exchange.

And we need to make the same connections for DV360. So DV360 connects to ad buyers. DV360 also connects to competitor ad networks. It connects to AdX. It connects to competitor exchanges, and it also can be used to connect directly to DFP and to competitor ad servers again.

Q Okay. All right. Now, internally at Google, the Court already knows -- you refer to the buy-side and the sell-side. So my question, Mr. Sheffer, is on the sell-side, were there any other sell-side tools for publishers?

A Yes. So we should add AdMob to this chart as well. We can put that perhaps below -- yeah, perfect. It looks right there -- and then we need to do a bunch of connections as well for AdMob.

Q Okay. But first, what's AdMob?

A So yes, AdMob is a dual-use product. It provides advertisements for app inventory specifically. That's the primary sort of as an ad network.

And the secondary property of AdMob is it provides a mediation platform, which is sort of a simplified ad server that some app developers choose to use.

Q Okay. And is AdMob the only Google tool that is used for apps?

A No, it is not.

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- 2 \parallel Q Okay. Can you explain that?
- 3 A Sure. So AdMob specifically serves app developers
- 4 | in-app inventory, but AdX and DFP are also utilized by app
- 5 developers for their app inventory.
- 6 | Q Now, the Court has also already heard that at some
- 7 point there came to be something called GAM or Google Ad
- 8 Manager. Can you speak a little bit about that?
- 9 A Sure. Google Ad Manager was the combining of DFP and
- 10 AdX together into a single streamline product. We had a lot
- 11 of feedback from our customers that having a single
- 12 | interface to manage your direct sales, all of your indirect
- 13 | efforts, as well as having the indirect demand coming from
- 14 | AdX would be useful in a single tool, a single interface for
- 15 | their teams.
- 16 Q Okay. And where does GAM go on the demonstrative?
- 17 A Sure. It goes over DFP and AdX because it sort of
- 18 combines that functionality together.
- 19 Q Okay. We've also heard a bit in this case about header
- 20 | bidding.
- 21 | A Yes.
- 22 | Q Where does header bidding belong in this constellation?
- 23 | A Yeah. So header bidding initially emerged as a direct
- 24 | code placement on a publisher website. So to start, we
- 25 could put a little header bidding indicator over by ad

sellers, if we can do that.

And then so header bidding would connect to ad sellers. But, you know, very quickly header bidding then became placed within ad servers, such as GAM and the competitor ad servers.

And we need to connect header bidding to competitor ad networks, as well as ad buyers because demand flowed in through those into header bidding.

Q Okay. Fantastic.

What is AdX Direct and where, if anywhere, does it belong here?

A So AdX Direct is a product that enables direct integration of AdX demand into a publisher's ad serving infrastructure. So we should add an AdX Direct tag perhaps on the upper left, and we would then want to connect AdWords and Google maybe a little bit to the right. Then we want to connect AdWords and Google Ads to AdX Direct, and then we should connect AdX Direct to ad sellers because that's where the demand then flowed.

Q Okay. And in listening to you, you're saying perhaps we should put this there and a little bit to the right.

So can you just explain -- you've been doing this for 18 years -- how you look at this? Is this, like, everything belongs in a precise place? Is it more fluid? How do you look at it?

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DSPs do.

Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor, since it is a Google witness, I would ask for a little bit less of a preamble. This is bordering on leading. THE COURT: Well, I don't think we need the preambles, Ms. Dunn. So I'll sustain that objection. All right. MS. DUNN: That's fair, Your Honor. BY MS. DUNN Mr. Sheffer, why do you say perhaps move it a little bit over there? Because this industry has been exceptionally fluid over the last 18 years. A lot of the companies that are operating across this entire ecosystem have changed and morphed their offerings and have shown up in multiple different places across this ecosystem. So this is a snapshot. It's a representative snapshot of an industry that has evolved a lot in the last 18 years. All right. What -- we've heard also about -- oh, I'm handed a note that we failed to do AdMob connections. What does AdMob connect to? Correct. AdMob would then connect to Google AdWords demand. We also have demand from computer competitor DSP's flowing into AdMob. Then AdMob connects to ad sellers. And I think that DV360 also can buy into AdMob just like other

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

1 Okay. All right. What is AWBid and where does it fit? 2 So AWBid is a way for Google AdWords' buyers to buy 3 remarketing inventory on inventory that was not within 4 AdSense or Google Ad Manager AdX. So we should draw a line 5 from AdWords Google Ads to competitor ad networks, 6 competitor exchange, as well as competitor ad servers. 7 And after Mr. Spalding does that, Mr. Sheffer, please 8 let us know if we're missing any connections on the 9 demonstrative. 10 Sure. 11 I think we're in -- the only thing I would -- so 12 one thing I would add is that AdMob is also utilized within 13 other mediation platforms by other app developers. So a 14 mediation platform is similar to a competitive ad server. 15 So we could connect AdMob to competitive ad servers there. 16 I think those are the major connections. 17 Okay. And with respect to AWBid, you mentioned 18 remarketing. Today does AWBid do -- what, if anything, does 19 AWBid do beyond remarketing? 20 I believe it's still fairly focused on remarketing. 21 All right. Now --22 THE COURT: Just for the record, I think you 23 should be able to print out a copy of this, and you want to 24 put a number on it, a label.

MS. DUNN: We do, Your Honor.

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

MR. TEITELBAUM: And, Your Honor, just for the		
record, I would also like to be able to address the		
electronic version on cross-examination. So I just want to		
make sure it's not going away.		
THE COURT: All right. So we don't want it erased		
but for purposes, again, for the public and transparency.		
MS. DUNN: Absolutely. We will save it, and we		
should mark it as the next exhibit.		
THE COURT: Like Sheffer Demo 1 or do you want to		
give it		
MS. DUNN: We would like for it to have a DTX		
number.		
MR. TEITELBAUM: It's not been disclosed on the		
exhibit list, Your Honor.		
THE COURT: So it would have to be a demo. It		
would have to be a demo.		
MS. DUNN: Okay. Sheffer Demo 1.		
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.		
MS. DUNN: First of all, thank you to		
Mr. Spalding.		
BY MS. DUNN		
Q Mr. Sheffer, I'm just going to ask you a few questions		
about the ad tech ecosystem.		
MS. DUNN: And, actually, if we could keep it up,		
please.		

BY MS. DUNN 1 2 If you were to identify on the screen the tools that 3 transact only on websites, which ones would you identify? 4 From a Google tool perspective, AdSense for Content is 5 specifically for HTML-coded websites. And AdSense for 6 Search is almost 100 percent utilized on HTML websites, 7 effectively. 8 Anything else? 9 I think that's mostly it. I mean, header bidding is 10 also something that's dominantly web-focused, yeah. 11 And to what extent are the rest of these tools 12 multifunctional? 13 They're definitely multifunctional. So GAM, for 14 example, handles all sorts of ad formats. So text, display 15 video, audio, digital out-of-home, like, every sort of ad 16 format you can possibly imagine across all sorts of 17 different modalities, whether it's an HTML website or an app 18 environment or instream/outstream video, again, digital 19 out-of-home environment and beyond, connected TV handles, all of that. 20 21 And there's other competitive ad servers and 22 competitor exchanges. The competitor DSPs, DBM, DV360, all 23 of these things buy into all that different type of 24 inventory as well.

Okay. And you mentioned display in the list you just

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1	gave. In your 18 years in the industry, have you ever heard
2	use of the term "open-web display advertising"?
3	A No.
4	Q And what would you what would be your response if
5	someone said to you that open-web display advertising refers
6	to a standardized series of ad sizes that web publishers
7	rely upon?
8	MR. TEITELBAUM: Objection to the form of the
9	question, hypothetical, compound
10	THE COURT: His impression doesn't mean anything.
11	So I'll sustain the objection.
12	BY MS. DUNN
13	Q Mr. Sheffer, to what extent are ads delivered in
14	certain formats and standardized ad sizes?
15	A So publishers/developers have a significant amount of
16	flexibility to determine the ad sizes, the ad formats on
17	whatever inventory they actually have. There are some
18	industry-standard formats that make it easier for the
19	industry to place ads in those specific types of formats.
20	But there's certainly a significant amount of
21	native ads or expandable ads, customized ads that publishers
22	and developers put into their particular inventory. So it's
23	a pretty wide variety of ads available.
24	Q And does that include you said native ads. Does
25	that include video ads also?

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

- A Yes.

 Q Okay. Now, looking at the screen, to what extent is everything, if at all -- is everything you see here software?
 - A These are all pieces of software that have been created that can make all these connections, yes.
 - Q And for each of the lines representing the connections, to what extent was there technical work put into that?
- A significant amount of technical work has to be done
 to make all of these connections. Some of those connections
 were obviously made by proprietary bodies. So like the
 Google AdWords to a search engine is a proprietary
 connection, but many of these other connections are
 industry-standard connections that have been developed and
 adopted by the entire ecosystem.
 - MS. DUNN: Okay. We can take that down. Thank you, Mr. Spalding.
- 18 BY MS. DUNN

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- 19 Q Mr. Sheffer, you talked just a little bit about ad
 20 servers. Are you aware of any examples of a publisher using
 21 more than one ad server?
- 22 | A I am, yes.
- Q And can you please explain to the Court just a couple of examples, if you have them.
 - A Certainly. So one major example of this would be Axel

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

Springer, which is a very large international publisher primarily in Germany, but they also have properties here in the United States, such as Business Insider and Politico. Politico, for example, is moving off of just GAM as an ad server and is adopting Microsoft Monetize as their primary ad server and going to be -- use GAM as their secondary ad server. So that's one example. Okay. Any other examples? Yeah. Sure. So there's the Internet Move Database, otherwise known as IMDb, which is used to be an independent website and app. It is now owned by Amazon. For a number of years now, they had been running on Amazon's proprietary internal ad server, but they've recently made the decision to implement -- and they've implemented now on their web properties and expanding to app -- Google Ad Manager. So they're using their Amazon proprietary ad server as their primary, and they're using Google Ad Manager as their secondary. And have you ever seen to any extent one company Okay. which has different subsidiaries use different ad servers? For sure, yeah. So there's several examples of this. One is the U.S. division of Fox. So Fox News, for example, utilizes Google Ad Manager for their properties. Fox Sports uses FreeWheel for their video properties. And then Tubi

uses their own proprietary ad server, which is known as

1 AdRise for their ad server. So that's three different 2 subsidiaries using three different ad servers. 3 All right. Mr. Sheffer, I'd like to show you what's 4 been marked as DTX 1511. You should have a binder up there. 5 And also, we can show it to you on the screen. 6 THE COURT: Any objection to 1511? 7 MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor, I think just the same 8 objection about out-of-court statements from Google. 9 just don't believe it's relevant. The fact that Mr. Sheffer 10 is here to be cross-examined about it doesn't change the 11 fact that it's hearsay. 12 THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm still going to 13 let it in because we've been doing that for a lot of these. 14 Go ahead. 15 MS. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor. BY MS. DUNN 16 17 All right. Mr. Sheffer, this is an email from Catera 18 Keeler to Patrick Cines cc'd to a listserv and others that 19 includes you. Do you see that? 20 Α I do. 21 And the subject line says "Amazon's IMDb-Deal Closed," 22 exclamation point. Do you see that? 23 I do. 24 And do you recognize this document?

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I do.

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

If you look at, Mr. Sheffer, the last sentence in the second paragraph, it says, "IMDb also leverages Amazon's in-house ad server to manage its direct deals and direct connection to the Amazon DSP." What's that referring to? So that refers to what I was saying is that IMDb is utilizing the proprietary ad server that Amazon has with all of Amazon's demand flowing through that. That's Amazon's DSP. That's the demand-size platform. All right. And then it says, "We've fully executed a deal and technical architecture which will allow Ad Manager to manage all of IMDB's indirect demand sources and allow AdX and OB to participate in their auction." And Ad Manager is Google Ad Manager, right? Correct. Α And OB is open bidding? Correct. Okay. And what does this refer to? So this means that IMDb has multiple different indirect demand sources that are flowing into their ad serving infrastructure. They will now be managed within Ad Manager completely under IMDb and Amazon's control. And that means what AdX demand as well open bidders will be able to bid into that inventory on IMDb.

And to what extent, if at all, are you seeing a

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

trend toward publishers building their own in-house ad 1 2 servers? 3 MR. TEITELBAUM: Objection as to "seeing a trend." 4 Lacks of foundation. THE COURT: Well, more than that, it's, I think, a 5 6 leading question too. But you can lay a foundation, I'm 7 sure, with this witness. 8 MS. DUNN: Absolutely, Your Honor. 9 BY MS. DUNN 10 Mr. Sheffer, are you in regular contact with publisher 11 customers of Google? 12 Α Yes. 13 Okay. And please describe the contact that you have 14 with them. 15 Sure. We talk to them about business opportunities, 16 about their technical plans for the future. 17 Okay. And are you personally involved in those 18 conversations? 19 Yes. 20 Okay. And what's the volume of those kinds of 21 conversations that you and your team are involved in? 22 They're for some of our team members daily. For me, 23 it's probably weekly, monthly depending on the size of the 24 customer.

All right. So, based on your experience working with

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advertising demand.

Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

the publishers and heading up a team, as you described, whose job is it to do this? What is your firsthand knowledge about publishers, if at all, shifting or thinking about shifting to proprietary ad servers? MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor, this is still just relaying things he's hearing from publishers. THE COURT: Nevertheless, I mean, given his position in the company, he can certainly indicate what his understanding is of the trend in the relevant industries. So I'm going to overrule the objection with that understanding. BY MS. DUNN Mr. Sheffer, just explain to the Court your understanding of the trend, please. Sure. So there are many publisher partners that consider on a regular basis whether to take ad serving in-house and develop their own proprietary customized technology. Obviously, it's a business decision for them, and it's completely up to their control whether they want to do that or not. And just to be clear, if a publisher does not Okay. want to use Google's ad server, can they still access the advertising demand that flows through AdX? Yes, there are multiple ways for them to access that

1 Okay. And can you describe what those are? So the first one, which is probably the most 2 Sure. 3 straightforward, is they can utilize GAM. So they would 4 call GAM within their own ad server, and they would set GAM 5 to call only AdX as a demand source. So it's basically a 6 direct integration of demand with flow right into their ad 7 server whether it's proprietary or a third-party ad server. So that's one method. 8 9 Q Okay. 10 The second method would be to utilize AdSense for 11 Content. So the demand for AdSense for Content, as we 12 talked about earlier, is Google Ads' demand, as well as 13 third-party demand. So you're getting effectively all of 14 the Google Ads' demand flowing through AdSense for Content, 15 and you can implement that directly into your 16 infrastructure, again, whether it's proprietary or a third 17 party. 18 The third method, which we had up on the chart 19 earlier, is AdX Direct, which is a product that, again, 20 enables direct integration for AdX demand into a publisher's 21 usually proprietary ad server. 22 And then there are direct technical connections 23 that we've implemented as well that take -- sorry -- Google 24 Ad demand and third-party demand directly into a publisher's 25 technical infrastructure.

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

Q Okay. I am not the last thing that you talked about
may be new to this trial. So can you explain what you're
describing?
A Sure. Yes. So we have a partnership with Twitter/X.
Sometimes I might say Twitter; sometimes I might say X.
It's a little old school.
But the idea there is that this is running
today is that Google Ads' demand, as well as third-party
buyers can buy directly into Twitter inventory
THE COURT: I'm sorry. Is there an objection?
MR. TEITELBAUM: Yes, Your Honor. I'm going to
object to the extent that information about any sort of
current partnership that hasn't been produced in discovery
and is being discussed from after the discovery cutoff.
THE COURT: I didn't get involved in your
discovery. So if this was not previously presented in
discovery and it was within the scope of a discovery
request, then it would not be proper to bring it out now.
MS. DUNN: Well, Your Honor
THE COURT: Do you want to talk for a second to
see whether there's a dispute there?
MR. TEITELBAUM: And I readily admit I don't have
all 12 million documents at my ready disposal. It's just I
don't have any awareness of this.

THE COURT: Was Mr. Sheffer deposed during

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

discovery? 1 2 MR. TEITELBAUM: During the investigation. He was 3 not during the litigation. 4 THE COURT: All right. Well, during the 5 investigation, he said he was deposed. 6 MR. TEITELBAUM: That's correct, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: All right. Did this issue come up? 8 MR. TEITELBAUM: Not at his deposition. 9 THE COURT: All right. 10 MS. DUNN: So, Your Honor, first of all, 11 plaintiffs' counsel has elicited from witnesses testimony 12 about what's happening today. And obviously, one of the 13 things they're seeking in this case is an injunction. 14 So they have --15 THE COURT: I'm sorry. But if what they requested 16 was presented to them during discovery, that's fair game. 17 So, again, there was no objection raised when those 18 questions were being asked. But now I have an objection 19 that this line of information was not presented during 20 discovery. 21 MS. DUNN: Here is what, I think, might solve the 22 problem and alleviate the issue. I think we -- Mr. Sheffer 23 was deposed during the investigative stage, and I'm not 24 seeking to introduce a document. And I think maybe we -- if 25 I would be permitted to ask him when they were -- this deal

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

came to be, when they were discussing it. If it was within the discovery period and he was not asked about, maybe that would solve the issue. MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor, in the interest of time, one solution I could propose is this testimony could go forward subject to our continuing objection. We can meet and confer at the end of the court day. And if it turns out that we have not been given the discovery to which we're entitled on this issue, then we would then ask the Court to strike this portion of testimony from the record. THE COURT: All right. We can do that. MS. DUNN: That seems very reasonable. BY MS. DUNN All right. Mr. Sheffer, please describe to the Court what you were talking about. Sure. So this is a direct technical integration from Google AdWords' demand, as well as other third-party bidders, that goes directly into Twitter's ads infrastructure. So Google Ads' advertisers and third parties now have the ability to bid directly and compete for ad placements within Twitter/X's fees. All right. THE COURT: Can you give us a sense of the timing when this was arranged?

THE WITNESS: Yeah. So the technical integration

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began earlier this year. And this is up and running as of
earlier this year and now is running at a fairly large run
rate for Twitter in terms of revenue.
MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor, I think we can
dispense with this now because of the fact the discovery
cutoff was September of 2023.
MS. DUNN: I think the issue is when did these
discussions begin because
THE COURT: All right. Let's ask that question.
BY MS. DUNN
Q Mr. Sheffer, when did Google begin speaking with
Twitter or X about this concept?
A Sure. So we've been talking to Twitter for a long time
prior to September 2023 about the possibilities of a
technical integration
THE COURT: I'm sorry. A long time?
BY MS. DUNN
Q Can you define a long time?
A For a number of years.
MR. TEITELBAUM: So I guess, for starters, we
would object right now to any testimony about anything that
occurred after the fact of the discovery cutoff, and then we
can have a follow-on discussion about before the fact
discovery cutoff.

THE COURT: Well, let's just leave this for now.

Let's move on to something else.

MS. DUNN: Sure, Your Honor.

BY MS. DUNN

Q Okay. Mr. Sheffer, why, if at all, would -- based on your experience, would a publisher want to use the ad server functionality in GAM?

A So the ad server is a mission-critical enterprise software tool that publishers use primarily and, most importantly, to drive their direct sales efforts. For most publishers, a rough rule of thumb is that 50 to 80 percent of their revenue comes from their direct sales efforts. And the ad server is the way by which they deliver against all of their advertiser agency commitments. So that means making sure that all the ad campaigns run according to schedule, that they fulfill all their contractual commitments, that they target those ads correctly to the types of users or the audiences that those advertiser agencies want. So that's a primary component of an ad server's capability.

There's also a secondary component, which is what we typically call indirect monetization. So this is a way that inventory that a publisher doesn't release to their direct sales team, they can then get other ad networks or other sources of demand to monetize that inventory, so additional revenue for the publishers.

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1 And, if you know, how much of publisher revenue comes 2 from direct deals? 3 It's roughly between 80 percent as a rule of thumb. 4 I'm sorry. Say that one more time. I couldn't --5 It's roughly between 50 to 80 percent as a rule of 6 thumb. 7 Okay. And to what extent, if at all, do you consider 8 the ad server functionality in GAM to be a good value for the price that is charged? 9 10 MR. TEITELBAUM: Objection as to "good value." 11 THE COURT: Sustained. BY MS. DUNN 12 13 How much does Google charge for GAM? 14 So GAM serving rates for publishers typically run a 15 penny or less CPM. And we also have a product that's called 16 DFP Small Business that enables publishers to utilize ad 17 serving up to 90 million impressions per month free of 18 charge. 19 Okay. And you said a penny or less per --20 That's a CPM. So that's a penny or less to serve a 21 thousand impressions compared to direct sales prices, which 22 are typically at least \$5 or \$10. 23 All right. And you mentioned specific functionality 24 for small business?

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Yes.

1 Okay. Please explain that to the Court. 2 So, again, DFP for Small Business is an ad Yeah. 3 server with a more limited set of functionality compared to 4 GAM and Ad Manager 360, but the primary purpose there is to 5 enable small businesses that want to utilize a direct sales 6 effort to serve those ads. 7 And, again, if they're under 90 million 8 impressions a month, all those impressions for ad serving 9 are free of charge. 10 Okay. And what constitutes being a small business such 11 that you get the 90 million impressions a month for free? 12 It's up to the publisher to sign up for whatever 13 product they would like. So anyone can sign up for the 14 small business product. And as long as there are under 15 90 million impressions a month, that ad serving is free. 16 Okay. Now, if a publisher uses the ad serving 17 functionality on GAM, can it turn off AdX? 18 Absolutely. It is completely within the publisher's 19 control. 20 And do you personally know any examples of a publisher 21 who has chosen to do that? 22 There are several hundred, actually. But some 23 names that we might all recognize would include Harvard 24 Business Review -- let's see. Who else? We have a 25 Nordstrom's, Walgreens, CVS. We also have the Public

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platform team?

Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

Broadcasting System that all use GAM for their direct sales but do not call the AdX functionality. All right. Now, for publishers who do sell inventory through AdX, to what extent is there additional demand available through AdX beyond DV360 and Google Ads? There is additional demand that is available. I have a team which is called the exchange platforms team that spends 100 percent of their time convincing third-party demand sources to spend their demand on the ad exchange. So these are companies like The Trade Desk, Amazon, Baidu, Yahoo, Liftoff. There's a whole list of those folks. And the idea is to bring that inventory --(Reporter clarification.) I'm sorry -- bring that advertising demand to our publishers. Okay. And just for the court reporter, you mentioned Baidu. Yes. Do you know how to spell that? Α B-A-I-D-U. And what is it? That's a very large Chinese company that runs a lot of ads. Okay. And how many people work on the exchange

1 It's 38 -- 39 right now. 2 Okay. And why -- can you just explain -- so you said your team is trying to persuade these companies to offer 3 4 their additional demand. Can you explain more about what 5 that is like. 6 Certainly. So all of those companies control their 7 demand. They have active advertiser sales teams that are 8 out there trying to bring money and dollars and ads into their ads' tools. They don't have to buy on the ad 9 10 exchange. And so what we try to do is present the publisher 11 inventory that we have available, the quality of it, the 12 reach of it, the different types of formats, modalities, and 13 convince those third parties to spend some of that 14 advertiser budget through the ad exchange benefiting our 15 publishers. 16 And to what extent are these companies that you're 17 trying to encourage to bid into AdX your competitors? 18 I think they're all my competitors. So when I think of this broad ecosystem, I think of any money -- advertising 19 20 money that's flowing through a Meta -- Meta is another one I 21 forgot to mention -- Meta or Amazon or Yahoo or Baidu, if 22 that money, that advertising money, is flowing into their 23 systems and going to their owned-and-operated properties, 24 that's revenue that our publishers aren't receiving.

So I see that as a massive amount of dollars that

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

we should be competing for and trying to convince those folks to spend their money on ad exchange, which will flow to our publishers. And how, if at all, does what you just describe relate to the term "unique demand"? So I think unique demand sort of depends on who you ask what that term might mean. I think at a very high-level, you know -- and Amazon probably considers their demand unique. They certainly position it in their marketing materials online. If you look at the marketing materials for Amazon's ad marketplace, they talk about Amazon --MR. TEITELBAUM: Objection to this summary of Amazon's marketing materials, Your Honor. THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection. I don't want these kinds of objections. This needs to come in in some form of comprehensible format. So let it go. Overruled. All right. BY MS. DUNN You can finish. All right. So sorry. So Amazon has within their marketing materials for the Amazon ad marketplace, which is effectively an ad exchange -- they specifically say Amazon demand, as well as other indirect sources, including header bidding. So it seems to me, from their marketing, they're positioning it as specific Amazon demand, and they're

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

talking very broadly about it. And just to close this out, if a publisher does not want to use any Google tools at all, what, if any, options do they have not to use Google's tools but still monetize their properties? There are dozens, if not hundreds, of companies and pieces of technology that they can use across that entire ads ecosystem that we talked about. Okay. We talked about some of the publisher partners who use Google's sell-side tools. How many publisher partners does Google have overall? It's on the order of 2 million publishing partners worldwide and about 220,000 in the U.S. alone. Please describe for the Court how Google goes about managing its relationships with so many publishers. So we have a tiered system of support and interaction with our publishers. As you might imagine, the publishers that are very, very large have a lower number of accounts per person that are handled. So our partner managers spend more time with our larger customers. But we also have a robust interaction system, both through technology but also through people that work with our medium and smaller size partners around the world.

And to what extent does Google take into account the

feedback from its publisher partners?

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

It's a critical part of how we operate our business and how we develop all of our tools, whether it's a direct one-to-one conversation with a partner, a large brand-name partner that we all might recognize, or the aggregated online feedback from the hundreds of thousands of smaller developers and publishers that we have worldwide. All that is collected, collated, looked at, and that forms the basis of information that we share with our product managers and engineering team about the features and the services that we're developing going forward. I am going to, in particular, ask you about the smaller publishing partners. Can you tell the Court how you go and collect their feedback and making sure that it's relayed internally? Sure. So we have a dedicated team, which is called our scale and insights team. That's a global team of people, obviously, located in each region. They're responsible for helping partners to implement, as well as troubleshoot and do customer support for all those partners. They do that through email tickets. They do it through help centers. They do it through various forms. But any comments or feedback that comes back from our partners, we aggregate that, and I receive basically a quarterly description and summary of all the feedback we get from our small partners. We have lots of data, lots of

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numbers around that.

We look at that. We say, what are the things that we're doing well? The things that we could be doing better? The things we can do better? We talk to our product manager engineering counterparts about how we can improve the product.

So all that feedback goes right into the developing process.

- Q Okay. All right. Mr. Sheffer, in your view, does Google face competition for ad tech?
- A Yes, fierce competition.
- Q And who, in your view, are Google's biggest competitors in the ad tech ecosystem that you have described?
 - A There's a long list here. So I can start off with Microsoft is a huge one, Amazon as well. We've got folks like Equativ. We've got folks like Kevel and Adzerk. Then, of course, like -- as I mentioned before, Meta is a huge competitor in terms of just ad dollars.

There are folks like AppLovin, IronSource, Unity, Tapjoy, Pangle, Chartboost, Media.net, Criteo, and many other ad networks as well that we can talk about on the -- on other areas there's folks like Magnite and PubMatic that compete directly with us as well. And I already mentioned some of the competitive DSPs also.

Q I'm not going to ask you to go through all of that, but

1 I did want to take moment on Microsoft. What is your view 2 about the competitive landscape with Microsoft? So Microsoft has made a number of investments over the 3 4 last -- in the last couple of years. They purchased Xandr 5 as an ad server, and they've relaunched it and rebranded it 6 as Microsoft Monetize. So that is a competitive ad server. 7 It's a very strong piece of technology, in addition to which 8 their purchase of LinkedIn many years ago gave them user 9 data that they're certainly using to create an advertising 10 business. They already have a search business; so they have 11 advertising demand from that. Their purchase of Activision 12 Blizzard King -- Activision Blizzard King -- so it's three 13 names together -- which is a gaming company, that gives them 14 a strong connection to a new interaction with users. 15 So when I look at that, they are creating an ad 16 technology and ad monetization system that will enable them 17 to utilize both their own demand and deliver ad monetization 18 and ad technology to publisher partners around the world. 19 And to what extent does your team analyze statements 20 made by your competitors in the market? 21 We analyze those all the time because it gives us some 22 interesting insights. 23 Can you describe how you do that? 24 Right. So we look at their marketing materials. We 25 look at their public -- we look at their financial

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We look at their marketing materials. We look 1 statements. 2 at the sales pitches. We get feedback from our customers on 3 what they're telling their customers as well. So we look at 4 all that material, and we try to get a sense of where 5 they're headed with their strategy and their technology 6 development. 7 And does what you just described apply to Microsoft? 8 Α Absolutely. 9 Q Meta? 10 Α Yes. 11 Criteo? Q 12 Α Yes. 13 TikTok? 14 Α Yes. 15 Trade Desk? 16 Α Yes. 17 Others that you mentioned? 18 Absolutely. 19 Okay. I'd like to specifically ask you about The Trade 20 Desk and whether you are aware or -- whether your team 21 tracks The Trade Desk earnings calls? 22 We do. 23 Okay. And to what extent, if at all, have you 24 personally become aware of statements made in Trade Desk 25 earnings calls?

Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

A So we review those earnings calls. We look at what our
competitors are saying about the marketplace, and we try to
get a sense of where they're headed with their strategic
direction and their technical direction. So it's pretty
important information for us.
Q Does that impact you as the head of your group?
A Absolutely. It gives us a sense of where we need to
focus our efforts and where we need to double our efforts.
Q Okay. And specifically with respect to the Trade Desk,
what, if anything what, if any, impact on you has The
Trade Desk earnings calls had?
A The most recent earnings calls there were some
statements in there that their CEO made around the
competitiveness of Google that I utilized to
THE COURT: Just a second. We're getting an
objection.
Is this, again, after the time period of discovery
closed?
MR. TEITELBAUM: At least I believe based on
the transcript that we have in the defense binder, that's
the time frame we're talking about, Your Honor. We are
talking about August 8, 2024, at least based on what's in
the binder.
MS. DUNN: So this is a public statement that has

already come up in this trial. And, in particular, this

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

witness read it. It impacted him, and he talked about it in specific with respect to competition and with respect to his So I don't seek to admit it for its truth, and it was not an available document during the production period. THE COURT: Well, the document is in evidence. MS. DUNN: It is not, Your Honor, in evidence. THE COURT: It was discussed. It was discussed. It was discussed MS. DUNN: but -- do you mind if I ask --THE COURT: Wait. Wait. One at a time. MS. DUNN: What happened was the CEO -- or I'm sorry, the CRO from The Trade Desk testified. But because the earnings statement was made by the CEO of The Trade Desk, an objection was made that it was hearsay. Your Honor didn't let it in. In this circumstance, this witness read it and conveyed it to his team and gave competitive direction to So I am offering it for the impact on the listener and not for the truth of the matter. THE COURT: I think you can ask this witness what, if any, directions he's been giving to his team to address perceptions of competitive pressure. That's certainly within the scope. But this degree of specificity isn't going to work if it didn't come out during discovery.

MR. TEITELBAUM: And we would just object to the

discussion, given that we're talking about August of 2024, after the discovery cutoff regardless of the --

THE COURT: So before August 2024, what, if any, discussions was this witness having with his team to address competitive problems?

MR. TEITELBAUM: I'm sorry, Your Honor. We would be asking for before September 2023, which was the fact discovery cutoff.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. DUNN: Well, Your Honor, just for the record then, there is some substantial testimony, including to which we objected, that the plaintiffs' counsel elicited from witnesses about up to the present day. So if that rule were to obtain, we'd have to go back and look at the record because that has been allowed when they elicited it. So this is very narrow. I'm happy to ask the question, Your Honor, reframed, but I think that rule has not been applied thus far.

THE COURT: Well, now that I'm thinking back, some of the third parties who came in -- I don't think the timing of their testimony was all that specific. All right.

We need to keep this moving. This is all not that devastating or changing any of the core issues, I don't think, in this case. It almost sounds like it's going to remedies versus liability, frankly. But anyway, let's just

continue this. All right. 1 BY MS. DUNN 2 3 All right. Mr. Sheffer, what direction have you given 4 your team with respect to competition? 5 So after reading that earnings report and what the CEO 6 said about our competitive status, I did two things: 7 One was I said to our team, "We need to find a way 8 to show up better in the marketplace to compete more effectively with The Trade Desk because. We need to do a 9 10 better job." 11 The second thing was I've used that as an internal 12 communication vehicle to try to get more resources for our 13 business from the senior leadership of Google. 14 And when you say that -- can you just explain to the 15 Court what you conveyed to your team? 16 Yes. So the statement that was made by the CEO said 17 that Google was --18 MR. TEITELBAUM: Objection. 19 THE COURT: At this point, I'm going to sustain 20 the objection. Quite frankly, a lot of this testimony is 21 going to be highly questionable and, I'm sure, open up a lot 22 of cross because, frankly, once Google is put on notice of 23 all of these lawsuits addressing these core issues, I think 24 some of this would already be tainted. All right. So think

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about that. All right.

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

BY MS. DUNN 1 2 All right. Mr. Sheffer, in your view, does Google have 3 to compete for publisher business to get publishers to use 4 Google's tools? 5 Absolutely. 6 And what is the process that Google engages in to 7 compete for publisher businesses in practice. 8 So one of the core processes is a RFP, which is a 9 request for proposal, that comes from publishers. 10 Publishers drive the entire process. It's the way by which 11 they make decisions around the ad technology that they're 12 utilizing. 13 Okay. And are you personally involved in the RFP 14 process? 15 I am, yes. 16 Okay. And what type of information does Google provide 17 in the context of the RFP process? 18 So there's typically three categories of information 19 that publishers ask for. One is the technical capabilities 20 of technology, of an ad server for example --(Reporter clarification.) 21 22 THE COURT: I'm sorry. You do have to slow down. 23 THE WITNESS: Okay. Sorry. 24 THE COURT: It's the end of day, and it's too 25 fast. We have background noise every time the door opens

and closes. So slow it down.

THE WITNESS: Sure. Sorry.

So there's three elements of -- usually three elements of an RFP. The first is the technical capabilities of the ad server. The second is the support and services that Google or anyone else would provide for that ad server installation. And the third is the commercial terms of pricing. Those are the three major components.

BY MS. DUNN

Q Okay. And let's start with the technical features.

What type of information is typically requested with respect to innovation or technology?

A So I think it's first important to mention that every RFP is different. So every publisher approaches this in a very different way. They ask for lots of different information.

But a general sort of summary is around things like reliability and uptime, latency, the accuracy of your ability to both forecast and deliver ads, your ability to deliver specific technical requirements — like can you handle this type of ad format, can you handle this type of data, can you handle this type of integration with some of the properties that we have, etc., etc. So there's a ton of — and, again, that varies widely across all of our different publishers when we get that RFP because every

installation is unique from a publisher perspective. 1 2 And to what extent, if at all, do publishers ask Google 3 to create new technological features? 4 They ask us all the time. So in many cases, they may Α 5 ask for a feature or a capability that we don't already have 6 within Google Ad Manager. So that often becomes a 7 discussion point between us and the partner. And sometimes 8 those features that we agree to develop for that RFP are 9 then utilized to develop for the entire customer set, the technology basis for the ad server or whatever product that 10 11 we're producing. 12 Okay. And do you have any examples of times when 13 Google built new features or customizations for its 14 publisher customers? 15 Yes, I do. So one example is Discord. So Discord is a 16 communications platform content system. It's where users 17 come together. They have -- their inventory is split 18 between web inventory, app inventory, and a web app. So 19 this is a specific type of app that runs on a computer. 20 And they wanted us to develop a connection into 21 their web app that would specifically enable us to deliver 22 ads into that environment, which is not something that we 23 have right now. So that was very important to them. 24 Discord at the time was trying to make a decision 25 between building their own proprietary ad server or to go

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

with a third party. So this is really important for us to commit to in order to win that deal from them. Okay. And the second thing that you mentioned was that the RFPs request pricing information. Can you speak to that? So pricing is one element of it, yes. So pricing typically comes in what are your ad serving fees. So we talked about that a little bit earlier. How much does it cost to serve an ad, as well as are there other additional charges for data packages or how data gets put into those ad requests. Then there's a conversation around the revenue shares that are associated with programmatic ad serving or the ad exchange, for example. Are there sometimes negotiation over those revenue shares? There are, yes. Okay. And you also mentioned that part of the RFP process is service levels. Can you explain what that means? Sure. So as you can imagine, given that the ad server is such a critical piece of enterprise technology and especially for the direct sales efforts, the publishers want to make sure that if anything goes wrong, they can get help and support for it. So, for example, if a publisher is running a

livestream, a live sporting event, and they're trying to

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

utilize their ad server to put ads into that livestream, it's something that they want to make sure they have someone on call from our side in case something goes wrong that we can correct that problem immediately. So that's sort of an on-call technical services person there. But, obviously, there's other things that might go wrong from time to time with the product. So they also want to know that they can reach someone at Google to correct those problems and to raise them with our product engineering team to get them fixed. Are you aware of any examples where Google had to make business concessions in order to win business? Α Absolutely, yes. And can you describe those? Sure. So we had a recent competitive process for Roku in which we had to make --MR. TEITELBAUM: Same objection, Your Honor. MS. DUNN: Okay. I don't know the date of that. So if it's beyond the period, it's my mistake. THE COURT: All right. Why don't you ask the witness. We'll see whether it comes in or not. MS. DUNN: Okay. BY MS. DUNN What was the date of the Roku RFP that you're talking

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1	A The RFP, I believe, started last year. We concluded
2	the deal this year, if I remember correctly, 2024.
3	THE COURT: That's too close.
4	MS. DUNN: That's fine.
5	THE COURT: Sustained.
6	BY MS. DUNN
7	Q Okay. Mr. Sheffer, do you have any examples prior to
8	September 2023 of when Google didn't win publisher business?
9	A Yes, of course.
10	Q Can you explain those to the Court?
11	A Yes. So sorry. I'm just having a mental block for
12	just a second. Sorry.
13	THE COURT: I'll tell you what. Before you
14	answer, why don't we take the afternoon break until 4:30.
15	MS. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor.
16	(Brief recess taken.)
17	THE COURT: All right.
18	MS. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor. Also I only
19	have a few minutes left. So nearing the end here.
20	BY MS. DUNN
21	Q Mr. Sheffer, right before the break, we were talking
22	about Google's submission of RFPs, and you had said that
23	occasionally sometimes Google wins, sometimes Google loses.
24	Do you recall that?
25	A Yes. Yes.

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- Q Okay. I wanted to ask you in particular about one deal that took place before the discovery period ended, and that
- 3 | is the deal with respect to Netflix.
- 4 A Yes.
- 5 | Q Okay. And you have personal knowledge about that, yes?
- 6 A That's correct, yes.
- 7 Q Okay. Please explain to the Court what the Netflix
- 8 deal was.
- 9 A So Netflix -- we all -- Netflix is a video streaming
- 10 | service. Netflix was looking for a partner for both ad
- 11 | technology, ad serving in particular, as well as a partner
- 12 | that would sell their streaming video inventory for
- 13 | advertisements on a global basis. So it was both an ad tech
- 14 | services deal, as well as representing their inventory and
- 15 | selling that inventory, producing ads, and giving revenue to
- 16 | Netflix.
- 17 Q Okay. And who were the bidders for the Netflix deal,
- 18 | if you know?
- 19 | A So Google was, as well as Microsoft.
- 20 Q Okay. And what happened?
- 21 A We ended up losing the deal to Microsoft.
- 22 | Q And when was that?
- 23 | A That was in 2023.
- 24 Q Okay. And if you know, why did Google lose the Netflix
- 25 deal to Microsoft?

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

So there were a number of factors. There was the ad technology. Netflix wanted specific development done for them with their ad technology stack, number one. Number two, they wanted a revenue guarantee for the inventory that their partner would then be representing for ad sales. And they wanted a sales team to actually go out and sell that inventory. The financial guarantee that they wanted was quite large. Microsoft, ultimately, wanted to do all technical work that they were asking for from their ad tech stack provider, as well as gave them a much larger financial guarantee than we were willing to give them. And what did Google do to compete for the Netflix deal? So we had agreed to do development work for their specific ad tech requirements. We also had agreed that we were going to have our sales team represent their streaming inventory against all their videos that they put ads against, and we had offered them a financial guarantee as well. If you'd look at your binder, Mr. Sheffer, at DTX 173. THE COURT: Any objection to 173? MR. TEITELBAUM: Just one moment, Your Honor. No objection.

THE COURT: All right. It's in.

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

1 MS. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor. 2 BY MS. DUNN 3 All right. Mr. Sheffer, if you could, look in your 4 binder at DTX 506. 5 Α DTX 506, got it. 6 THE COURT: Any objection to 506? 7 MR. TEITELBAUM: Just consistent with the Court's 8 prior ruling. No objection. 9 THE COURT: All right. It's in. 10 BY MS. DUNN 11 Mr. Sheffer, do you recognize DTX 506? 12 Α I do. 13 What is it? 14 Oh, sorry. I'm on the wrong tab. No -- this is 506, 15 yes. 16 So this is an email that I sent out to my global 17 team at the end of 2017 giving a high-level summary of our 18 2018 strategy plan. 19 Okay. And at the top, you will see something that says 20 "TL;DR"? 21 Yes. 22 What does TL; DR stand for? 23 That means too long, didn't read. It's a summary of 24 the rest of the email in a few sentences. 25 And then if you scroll down from the TL;DR, it Okay.

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Direct Examination - S. Sheffer

says -- you say to your team, "As we approach the final days of 2017, I'd like to share a high-level overview of our 2018 global plan with you." Do you see that? Α I do. And the first sentence there reads, "Helping our publishers and developers to grow their online businesses is at the heart of what we do, tying directly to our OPG vision to fund the world's information by enabling content creators." Do you see that? Α I do. Okay. And then it goes on to say, "Why does this matter? First, we enable our partners to pursue their passions and create meaningful jobs. Second, we help to create a globally diverse and open digital ecosystem of information and viewpoints which is good for humanity. Third, the creation of an open information ecosystem is strategically important for Google, especially for our search business." Do you see that? I do. And can you please explain what is this phrase, "fund the world's information"? So that is our vision. That is the motivating reason

Cross-Examination - S. Sheffer

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,	that we come to work every day as a team. And the entire
	idea here is that by providing the ad technology and ad
	monetization services that we do, as well as the other
:	products and services, we are enabling funding for content
	creators around the world to pursue their passions, to put
	information out into the open ecosystem.
	Q And how long for how long has that been your vision
	and your team's vision?
	A So I think we developed that vision formally in 2013,
	but it was sort of a guiding principle even before that.
	MS. DUNN: Your Honor, I pass the witness.
	THE COURT: All right. Cross-examination?
	MR. TEITELBAUM: Yes, Your Honor, and we'll be
:	passing out binders shortly, Your Honor.
	CROSS-EXAMINATION
	CROSS-EXAMINATION
	BY MR. TEITELBAUM
	Q Good afternoon, Mr. Sheffer. How are you doing?
	A Good. How are you doing?
	Q I'm good. Thanks.
,	So I have a few questions for you just returning
	to the subject of the different ad tech products that Google
	has within the ad tech ecosystem demonstrative.
	A Yes.
ı	

Is it fair to say that Google itself actually divides

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Cross-Examination - S. Sheffer

inventory advertising inventory across the web into a
series of categories? Is that fair? For instance, do you
decide search inventory from instream video inventory?
A Yes, we have separate products for search, as an
example.
Q Okay. So why don't we take a look. If you could, go
to the white binder, I think, that should also be in front
of you
A Got it.
Q at what's been marked for identification as PTX 764.
THE COURT: Any objection to 764?
MS. DUNN: The Court's indulgence, Your Honor.
I'm just trying to find it.
MR. TEITELBAUM: Just for the record, the metadata
sheet there in the front is just there for references.
THE COURT: All right. Now, as we prepare the
record for this case, all of these meta sheets should be
removed from the exhibits. Is that your intent or not?
MR. TEITELBAUM: Unless otherwise noted, I think
the default would be that the metadata sheets would not be
in there, Your Honor.
MS. DUNN: I think we can confer on that.
MR. TEITELBAUM: I'm not trying to keep them out.
I'm just

THE COURT: I understand that, but the problem is

Cross-Examination - S. Sheffer

1	I'm not sure
2	(The Court and the courtroom deputy confer.)
3	THE COURT: Yeah, we have not been taking them
4	out. So at some point, we're going to have to make sure
5	that we have one accurate record. All right?
6	MR. TEITELBAUM: Understood, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: For the purposes of getting the trial
8	done, that's fine.
9	MR. TEITELBAUM: Okay.
10	THE COURT: Ms. Dunn, was there any objection,
11	then, to this exhibit? It's 764.
12	MS. DUNN: Other than the standing caveat about
13	the comments in the margin, there's no objection.
14	THE COURT: All right. So 764 is in without the
15	comments.
16	BY MR. TEITELBAUM
17	Q And, Mr. Sheffer, at the very top of the first page
18	that actually has text on it so the Bates number ending
19	in 251 do you see that there at the top? It says, "Sell
20	side BFM Deck."
21	A Yes.
22 23	Q And BFM, does that stand for business focus meeting? A Yes. Q Okay. And you and Bonita Stewart are both listed next
23	A Yes.
24	Q Okay. And you and Bonita Stewart are both listed next
25	to different categories of talking points?

Cross-Examination - S. Sheffer

- 1 Α Yes. 2 So let's look first at the bottom of that page. 3 And so these are, like, notes that go along with the slide 4 deck, right? 5 They appear to be, yes. 6 Okay. Underneath the "sell-side revenue metrics" slide 7 on that same page, there's a reference to "display web." 8 Do you see that there? 9 Α Yes. 10 And then when we go to the next page at the bottom, there's a reference to "display app." 11 12 Do you see that? 13 I do. 14 So that just reflects that Google is keeping track of 15 display web inventory separate from display app inventory, 16 right? 17 We tracked those things -- the revenue separately 18 because they were different products, yeah. 19 Okay. And then if we go to the next page at the 20 bottom, do you see "premium video" there? 21 Yes. 22 And there's a reference to this column reflecting
- 24 A In the second line, yes. Okay.

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Q Okay. And there's just a reflection that instream

"instream formats on instream video content," right?

Cross-Examination - S. Sheffer

- video is a special kind of video that Google tracks in the ordinary course of its business, right?
 - A It is a type of video content that we do track, yes.
- 4 | Q Okay. The next page, you see "search"?
- $5 \mid A \quad Yes.$

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- 6 | Q And next to that it actually says "the traditional
- 7 AdSense for Search business." That's what AFS stands for,
- 8 | right?
- 9 A Correct.
- 10 Q So that's a separate category as well?
- 11 **|** A Yes.
- 12 Q And then if we could go to the page ending in Bates
- 13 | number 259. So it's several pages back.
- 14 A Yes. Okay.
- 15 Q You see "native web" there, right?
- 16 | A Yes.
- 17 | Q And so that's a separate category from display web that
- 18 we saw earlier on the very first page of the notes. Do you
- 19 ∥ recall that?
- 20 A Yes. I think this was an emerging product area which
- 21 was why it was tracked separately, yeah.
- 22 | Q Okay. And then, similarly, we have "native app" on the
- 23 | following page at the top, also tracked separately from
- 24 | those other categories?
- 25 | A Yes. Because it was emerging, yep.

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Cross-Examination - S. Sheffer

1	Q And, finally, just the last couple of questions with
2	respect to this exhibit.
3	If we look at the Bates number ending in 261,
4	there's also a whole separate category for "video instream."
5	Do you see that?
6	A I see it, yes.
7	Q There's a comment that the instream video opportunity
8	in 2018 is estimated at about \$11 billion?
9	A Yes.
10	Q That's because instream video is a particularly premium
11	type of advertising inventory, right, in terms of the cost
12	of in terms of CPM?
13	A Yes.
14	MR. TEITELBAUM: We can take that exhibit down.
15	So if we could actually please bring up the
16	demonstrative that Google's counsel used with you.
17	THE COURT: The football.
18	MR. TEITELBAUM: Yeah, the spaghetti football,
19	Your Honor.
20	So with Mr. Spalding's assistance and I guess I
21	just want to confirm that the version that Google's counsel
22	created is now saved and indelibly marked in history before
23	I start asking for changes.
24	THE COURT: Yes.
25	MR. TEITELBAUM: Okay. So thank you in advance,

Cross-Examination - S. Sheffer

- 1 Mr. Spalding.
- 2 BY MR. TEITELBAUM
- 3 Q Mr. Sheffer, AdMob at the bottom, that's just for
- 4 | in-app inventory, right?
- 5 A AdMob -- again, there's two components to it. One is
- 6 | the ads that are delivered in app inventory, and there's a
- 7 | mediation platform associated with it, but yes.
- 8 | Q Associated with in-app inventory?
- 9 A That is correct, yes.
- 10 Q Okay. So if I am The Wall Street Journal's website and
- 11 | I want to sell a display ad on the front page of my desktop
- 12 | website --
- 13 **|** A Yes.
- 14 ∥ Q -- AdMob is not useful to me, right?
- 15 | A It is not. You would use GAM because they're a GAM
- 16 | customer. They use it for their web and their app
- 17 | inventory.
- 18 MR. TEITELBAUM: All right. So, Mr. Spalding, if
- 19 | we can, please remove AdMob and all of the connections
- 20 associated with it from this demonstrative.
- 21 | BY MR. TEITELBAUM
- 22 Q And then, as we saw in PTX 764, search inventory is
- 23 | separate from display, right?
- 24 A It is a -- it is a separate product designed to put ads
- 25 on search results.

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That is correct, yes.

Cross-Examination - S. Sheffer

Okay. And so in other words, if I am, once again, The Wall Street Journal and I want to sell a display ad banner at the top of the front page, AdSense for Search, Search O&O, I can't use those, right? Well, I mean, Search O&O is Google's owned-and-operated properties, and AdSense for Search is specifically for search results, yes. So I can't use either of those tools to do what I just described --For a display ad on your page, that's correct, yes. MR. TEITELBAUM: Okay. So, Mr. Spalding, if we could, please remove those two. BY MR. TEITELBAUM Let's talk about AdSense for Content for a second. So I believe you mentioned that websites can sell display inventory through AdSense for Content. That is right. However, if I am, once again, The Wall Street Journal -- a large publisher like The Wall Street Journal is going to have both direct deals and going to want to sell inventory programmatically or indirectly, correct? Generally, yes. And AdSense for Content doesn't have functionality to manage direct deals, correct?

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Cross-Examination - S. Sheffer

And I believe you mentioned on your direct testimony that many publishers, in fact, view DFP or other publisher ad servers as mission critical for that very reason, right, to be able to manage direct and indirect in the same tool? That is correct. MR. TEITELBAUM: Okay. So let's take AdSense for Content off the board as well, please. BY MR. TEITELBAUM Let's talk about AdX Direct for a second. Sure. When a publisher like the -- I'll switch publications just to try to be somewhat more diverse. Let's talk about The Staunton News Leader now, please. If The Staunton News Leader is selling inventory on its website using AdX Direct, The Staunton News Leader can't get a real-time bid out of AdX through AdX Direct, right? When you say -- you're referring to their indirect sales efforts --Correct. -- for the Staunton --The Staunton News Leader, which is a Staunton, Virginia --Got it. The Staunton News Leader. So for their indirect -- if we had a partnership with them using AdX Direct, they could. But we do not have

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Cross-Examination - S. Sheffer

- 1 a partnership with them on AdX Direct. 2 Well, AdX will return a yes or no -- yes, AdX wants to 3 buy the impression or, no, AdX doesn't want to buy the 4 impression -- correct? 5 Sorry. Are we talking about AdX Direct or an 6 integration in GAM? 7 We're talking about AdX Direct. 8 Okay. So AdX Direct receives a bid request. And it 9 may or may not return an ad depending on the type of 10 inventory and the content and the associated metadata, yes. 11 But it does not return a price, correct? It just 12 returns a yes or no? 13 I don't know the technical details of whether it 14 returns a price or not. 15 Okay. And that's partly because, as I believe you 16 mentioned also to one of my colleagues during your 17 deposition, that you're not the technical guy, right? 18 You're in the sales operation? 19 I'm on the sales and partnership sides, yes. 20 All right. So I'm just going to ask that you take my
- MR. TEITELBAUM: And let's take AdX Direct off the board as well, please.
- 24 BY MR. TEITELBAUM

word for it for the moment.

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Q And so a question for you about GDN and competitor ad

Cross-Examination - S. Sheffer

- 1 networks --2 Okay. 3 So an ad network doesn't run auctions, right? 4 I think it depends on how the ad network determines 5 which ads to serve. In some cases, they may have multiple 6 different advertisers and could run an auction, but it 7 depends upon their decision-making process, which varies by ad network. 8 9 But that's not -- for instance, that's not a core 10 functionality of an ad network, right? 11 It could be. It just depends on what the ad network 12 decides to do for decision-making. 13 Okay. But you're not really sure? 14 I don't know the intimate details of all the technology 15 of all the competitive ad networks. 16 Okay. So once we finished sort of talking about all 17 the ways that a website can sell inventory, we're left 18 basically with header bidding, right? That's still there? 19 When you say "sell," though -- sorry. I just need some 20 clarification. Is that sell directly or sell indirectly? 21 Let's stick with selling indirectly. 22 Okay. Well, selling indirectly, you can use AdSense.
 - A Okay. They can sell their indirect through AdSense.

So let's stick with a publisher that has both direct

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and indirect sales.

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Cross-Examination - S. Sheffer

1	Q And then you're saying that they would also use DFP to
2	do their direct deals?
3	A They can use what other ever ad server they would want
4	for their direct deals, yes.
5	Q Okay. But you had testified previously, right, that
6	that's an extremely rare setup, right?
7	A Sorry. Which
8	Q At your deposition, you explained that usually what
9	happens is a publisher, if it has direct deals, it's just
10	going to grow up to DFP, right?
11	A It can grow into DFP or it uses competitive ad servers.
12	Like, it's completely up to the publisher to decide that.
13	MR. TEITELBAUM: If I could just have one moment,
14	Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: You're saying that a website that
16	wants to sell indirectly can use AdSense?
17	THE WITNESS: Absolutely, yes.
18	THE COURT: Just AdSense, not those other versions
19	of AdSense?
20	THE WITNESS: AdSense for Content, yes.
21	BY MR. TEITELBAUM
22	Q And just to make sure we're clear, AdSense for Content
23	does not have a way of comparing direct deals versus
24	indirect sales, right?
25	A No. That would be done within whatever decision-making

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Redirect Examination - S. Sheffer

logic the publisher has on their technical stack. It could be their proprietary decision-making process. It could be how they organize their calls manually, or they could do that with an ad server. Such as DFP? Or any other ad server, such as Microsoft Monetize. MR. TEITELBAUM: I'll pass the witness. Thank you, Mr. Sheffer. THE COURT: All right. Ms. Dunn? MS. DUNN: Just very briefly, Your Honor. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. DUNN Mr. Sheffer, you were shown PTX 764. It's a document that reflects a creation date sometime in 2017. Your name is in the metadata but not on the document. Do you see that? 764? 764, yes. Yes, I got it. Thank you. No problem. Okay. And you were directed to something called display And if you look at page 2 with Bates number 252, do you see that? Yes.

All right. And you see under summary -- do you see

Redirect Examination - S. Sheffer

that? 1 2 Sorry. 3 THE COURT: Look at what's on the screen. 4 BY MS. DUNN 5 It's also on the screen. 6 It's on the top of the page. Okay. 7 "Although 7 percent is reasonable," that part? 8 Q Right. 9 Yep. 10 And after that it says, "We should expect to face 11 headwinds as user preferences change web to app." 12 Do you see that? 13 I do. 14 Okay. And then if you turn to -- one second --15 there -- on page 258 of this document, there's a section 16 where the title of the section is "Exchange and Network 17 Bidding." 18 Do you see that? 19 I do. 20 Okay, and little A. Do you see little A? 21 Little A, yes. 22 It says, "The rise of header bidding, when pubs call 23 other competitive networks and exchanges like Amazon, 24 Facebook, or Rubicon, outside of the ad server is 25 exacerbating this problem."

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Redirect Examination - S. Sheffer

1	Do you know what problem they're talking about
2	there?
3	A So this is Amazon, Facebook, Rubicon competing directly
4	for publisher inventory.
5	Q And do you see little B?
6	A I do.
7	Q And at risk of irritating the Court, you see where it
8	says, "This is posing something of an existential risk on
9	our sell-side business"?
10	Do you see that?
11	A I do.
12	Q "And there's a risk that DSPs, in addition to networks
13	and exchanges, also bid in header tags, putting much of our
14	AdX revenue at risk."
15	Do you see that?
16	A I see that, yes.
17	Q And that was the state of affairs, as you recall it, in
18	2017, correct?
19	A That is correct.
20	MS. DUNN: Your Honor, no further questions.
21	MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor, with the Court's
22	indulgence, we have a little bit of an exhibit snafu, and I
23	do just have a few more questions for Mr. Sheffer related to
24	a document that I can hand up now.
25	THE COURT: No. We

Redirect Examination - S. Sheffer

1	MR. TEITELBAUM: It relates to spoliation
2	preservation. So I do think it could be an appropriate
3	recross topic just for credibility purposes.
4	THE COURT: You know, I've heard the spoliation
5	issue so many times. I mean, unless it's absolutely new, I
6	understand the issue.
7	MR. TEITELBAUM: I do think that we need to build
8	a record with each witness, and it is
9	THE COURT: I'm sorry. Do you just want to move
10	the exhibits into evidence?
11	MR. TEITELBAUM: This is not a disclosed exhibit.
12	I just have questions about one of Mr. Sheffer's emails very
13	briefly, and then we can move on.
14	MS. DUNN: Your Honor, in particular, because this
15	is not a disclosed exhibit, we're happy to meet and confer
16	about this.
17	MR. TEITELBAUM: I'm not seeking to enter it into
18	evidence.
19	MS. DUNN: Even more so.
20	THE COURT: Well, it's recross, but it's not
21	within the scope of the redirect. So I'm going to sustain
22	your objection.
23	MS. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor.
24	THE COURT: All right. Now, are we going to
25	depositions now?

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1	MS. DUNN: Yes, Your Honor. The next Google
2	witness is via a read-in, the Microsoft witness Benneaser
3	John.
4	THE COURT: All right. I'm sorry. Is anybody
5	going to call Mr. Sheffer again as a witness? Does either
6	side anticipate calling him?
7	MS. DUNN: We'd like to reserve the ability to do
8	so.
9	THE COURT: All right. Then, Mr. Sheffer, you may
10	leave for today. But at some point, you may get recalled.
11	So make sure your contact information is accurate, and
12	you're not to discuss your testimony with any witness who
13	has not yet testified.
14	THE WITNESS: Understood.
15	THE COURT: All right. You're free to go.
16	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
17	MS. DUNN: Your Honor, this will take us
18	through I think take us through the end of the day
19	depending on how quickly we read.
20	THE COURT: All right. You can't read too
21	quickly.
22	MS. DUNN: I aim to not do that.
23	THE COURT: All right.
24	MS. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Is everybody set?

Read-In Deposition - B. John

1 (The deposition of Benneaser John is read as 2 follows:) 3 Good afternoon. Can you state your name for the 4 record, please. 5 Benneaser John, and I go by Ben John. 6 And where do you live? 7 Α Princeton, New Jersey. 8 Q What is your current position at Microsoft? 9 Α VP of engineering. 10 And when did you start working at Microsoft? Q 11 June 6, 2022. Α 12 And prior to Microsoft, where did you work? 13 Α At Xandr. 14 And when did you start working at Xandr? 15 I started at AppNexus late 2012, and AppNexus evolved Α 16 to Xandr as part of the AT&T acquisition. 17 Q And what was your position at Xandr? 18 CTO. 19 And you said prior to Xandr, you worked at AppNexus? 20 Α Yes. 21 And when did you start working at AppNexus? 22 January 2013 to be exact. 23 What was your position at AppNexus? 24 I played multiple roles. I started as head of 25 engineering for web services, then SVP of engineering for

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1	buy-side systems, and then I took the CTO role.
2	Q And you're prepared to testify today as the corporate
3	representative of Microsoft, including as to topics relating
4	to Xandr, which was acquired by Microsoft in 2022, and also
5	AppNexus, which was acquired by AT&T in 2018 when it was
6	integrated into AT&T's new tech offering which was branded
7	Xandr, correct?
8	A That is correct.
9	Q And just for the record, Microsoft acquired your former
10	company, Xandr. Was that in 2022?
11	A Uh-huh. Oh, sorry. Yes.
12	Q And Xandr, just for the record, is an advertising
13	technology company with buy- and sell-side capabilities?
14	A That's correct, yes.
15	MS. DUNN: Your Honor, we move to admit DTX 7, and
16	we'll also put it on the screen.
17	THE COURT: Any objection to 7?
18	MS. WOOD: No objection.
19	THE COURT: All right. It's in.
20	BY MS. DUNN
21	Q I'm not going to ask you, sir, about this entire
22	document, but my first question is do you have any reason to
23	doubt that this is a presentation to the Microsoft board of
24	directors regarding DoubleClick prepared by Microsoft
25	employees in the ordinary course of business?

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Yes.

Read-In Deposition - B. John

And I will tell you that it was produced to DOJ in response to DOJ's civil investigative demand. It is a Microsoft document, yes. So at this point in 2007, the Microsoft board deck says that Microsoft wanted to become the leading platform for all media and the partner of choice for publishers looking to monetize their content. Do you see that? Α Yes. And then if you look a little bit farther down in the Microsoft board deck, do you see where Microsoft is acknowledging that it was inevitable as of 2007 that exchanges would develop because they are inherently more efficient than one-to-one negotiated advertising? Do you see that? Yes, that is correct. To what extent, if you're aware, is it the case that Google -- excuse me -- that Microsoft tried to prevent Google from acquiring DoubleClick for Publishers in 2007? Microsoft was in the conversations with DoubleClick for providing a better monetization service for all the publishers. And it says, "The price of Google's offer believed to be \$2.6 billion." Do you see that?

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

Q Mr. John, you testified that, according to the
Microsoft board deck we've been discussing, Microsoft
believed Google had offered \$2.6 billion to buy DoubleClick,
and then you testified that Microsoft bid \$3 billion.
Do you recall that?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q And are you aware that after Microsoft learned that it
had not been selected for the DoubleClick acquisition, it
then tried to get the government to block the acquisition?
A Microsoft appealed about the acquisition. That is
correct.
Q And when you say it appealed the decision, to whom did
it appeal the decision?
A I believe it is let me double-check the FTC.
Q So tell me if I have this right. Microsoft Advertising
is a tool that advertisers can use to buy ads, and that
includes both search ads and display ads?
A That is correct.
Q And can advertisers use Microsoft Advertising to buy
ads on Microsoft's owned-and-operated properties?
A Yes, they can.
Q And when we're talking about Microsoft's
owned-and-operated properties, the ones that I'm familiar

Are all of those Microsoft owned-and-operated

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

1 properties? 2 Yes. 3 Can advertisers also use Microsoft Advertising to buy 4 ads on third-party sites? 5 Α Yes, they can. 6 Which third-party sites can advertisers use Microsoft 7 Advertising to buy ads on? Microsoft's open web. Like most other publishers, 8 9 anyone that does have a relationship with Microsoft 10 advertisers can buy. 11 Can you name a few? 12 Axel Springer, Schipsted, yeah. 13 Any others? 14 Most other publishers, Bloomberg, Wall Street 15 Journal, New York Times. 16 Now, is it fair to say that Google Ads is a tool that 17 advertisers can use to buy search ads and display ads on 18 Google's owned-and-operated properties? 19 That is my understanding. 20 And is it also your understanding that Microsoft 21 competes with Google -- Microsoft Advertising competes with 22 Google Ads? 23 That is correct. 24 And does Microsoft Advertising also compete with

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Facebook Ads?

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1	A That is correct. Advertisers use multiple platforms
2	and yes.
3	Q So my question, Mr. John, is are there other
4	competitors to Microsoft Advertising besides Google Ads and
5	Facebook Ads?
6	A For advertisers, yes, Amazon, Trade Desk.
7	Q Any other competitors besides Google Ads, Facebook Ads,
8	Amazon, and The Trade Desk?
9	A There may be many, but yes.
10	Q Can you think of any of the many, as you sit here,
11	other than the ones that you've mentioned?
12	A Yahoo is the one.
13	Q Yahoo. Any others?
14	A Those are the ones I can remember for now.
15	Q Okay. But there may be more?
16	A Correct.
17	MS. DUNN: Your Honor, I move to admit DTX 847,
18	and we'll put it on the screen.
19	THE COURT: Any objection?
20	MS. WOOD: No objection.
21	THE COURT: All right. It's in.
22	Q And after scanning it, do you have any reason to doubt
23	that this is a document prepared my Microsoft in the
24	ordinary course of business given that it was produced to
25	Google in response to a document subpoena?

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

If this is helpful, the reason we ask this question is just so you can authenticate it as a Microsoft document. Yes, it is a Microsoft document. It looks like it. And what's the Microsoft Audience Network? The Microsoft Audience Network connects with Microsoft, 0&0 properties, as well as reaches to the open-web publishers taking advertisers and helping them to reach the audience across Microsoft O&O, as well as the open web. Do you see where it says, "With Microsoft audience ads, you can reach hundreds of millions of people through premium sites that are brand-safe"? Do you see that? Α Yes, I do. Just to see if I have this right, is the Microsoft Audience Network, MSAN, the collection of sites on which ads can appear if an advertiser uses a Microsoft advertising buying tool? If the advertiser uses the Microsoft Audience Network buying tool, yes, they can reach Microsoft 0&O properties, as well as the publishers that are connected with Microsoft, correct. And if you turn to page 20 of 28 in this deck, you'll see a graph, and the title of the graph says --MS. DUNN: And, Your Honor, the next two lines are sealed.

Read-In Deposition - B. John

1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 Do you see that? 3 Yes, I do. 4 To what extent, if at all, is this graph illustrating 5 that the Microsoft Audience Network has experienced 6 significant revenue growth between July 2017 and August of 7 2019? This is Microsoft Audience Network growth, if that's 8 9 what you mean. I believe that, yes. 10 And it shows significant revenue growth over that 11 period of time? 12 Α That is correct. 13 MS. DUNN: Your Honor, move to admit DTX 1129. 14 MS. WOOD: No objection. 15 THE COURT: All right. It's in. 16 Sir, do you recognize this as a Microsoft business 17 record? 18 Yes, it is a Microsoft document. 19 It says, "Google import from Microsoft Advertising 20 makes copying campaigns from Google Ads easy, helping you 21 reach more customers instantly." 22 Do you see that? 23 Yes, I do. 24 And do you know how Google import works? 25 Yes, I do.

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

1 O How does it work? 2 Basically, as an advertiser, you can go to Google and 3 create a campaign, set up the target audience, set up the 4 keywords, set up the budget, all of those things, and those 5 campaigns run on Google. And if the same advertiser don't 6 want to come and set up all the metadata in Microsoft, 7 Google has a feature that exposes only the metadata to 8 Microsoft Advertising. An advertiser can log in to 9 Microsoft Advertising, click "Google import" as it shows on 10 the screen, and the metadata will come into the server. 11 relieves some work for the advertisers. Then the advertiser 12 can edit within Microsoft, and the campaign executes. And 13 all the bidding happens within the Microsoft platform. 14 So is it accurate, then, that advertisers don't have to 15 choose between Google and Microsoft; they can use both? 16 They can use both, correct. 17 And do I have this right, that Google import can be 18 used with both -- both with search and display ad campaigns? 19 Yes, it can. 20 And is it also accurate that Google doesn't preclude 21 advertisers from using Google import? 22 No, it does not. It's a feature of Google. 23 Sir, are you aware that this lawsuit was filed by the 24 U.S. government against Google in early 2023?

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Yes, I do.

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1	Q And when did Microsoft acquire your former company,
2	Xandr?
3	A So the deal was announced December 2021, and the close
4	was June 6, 2022.
5	Q So a little over a year after Microsoft announced it
6	was acquiring Xandr and about six months after the deal
7	closed, the United States brought suit against Google?
8	A Yes, that is correct based on the dates.
9	Q Now, Xandr originated as a company called AppNexus, and
10	you were the CTO of AppNexus?
11	A Yes, I was the CTO.
12	Q Now, to what extent, if at all, did AppNexus have an
13	end-to-end technology stack that consisted of a publisher ad
14	server, an ad exchange, and a demand-side platform?
15	A Yes. We did have both buy-side and sell-side
16	Q Right.
17	A DSP and SSP and ad server.
18	MS. DUNN: Your Honor, move to admit DTX 379.
19	THE COURT: Any objection?
20	MS. WOOD: No objection.
21	THE COURT: All right. It's in.
22	MS. DUNN: And we'll put that on the screen.
23	Q The metadata for this document indicates the custodian
24	is Brian O'Kelley. Who is Brian O'Kelley?
25	A He was the CEO of AppNexus and my former boss.

1	Q Your former boss.
2	The file name is "Sayta outline."
3	Satya Nadella is the CEO of Microsoft?
4	A That is correct.
5	Q And do you have any reason to doubt that this is a
6	document prepared in the ordinary course by AppNexus?
7	A It is prepared by AppNexus. I was very familiar with
8	this. I was part of this document.
9	Q I'll direct your attention, sir, to the first paragraph
10	where it says, "It seems to be in Microsoft's interests, if
11	not existential for LinkedIn and a free Windows, to have
12	advertising ecosystem that isn't dependent on Google,
13	Facebook, and Amazon."
14	Do you see that?
15	A Yes, I do.
16	Q Now, LinkedIn is part of Microsoft, right?
17	A That is correct.
18	Q And it's a social media site app?
19	A That's correct.
20	Q And it's part of advertising ecosystem, correct?
21	A That is correct.
22	Q And if you look at the next paragraph, it goes on to
23	say, "This is an ideal time to make a big play. The battle
24	lines are being drawn to determine the major winners of the
25	upcoming cycle. Amazon is stealthy, aggressive, and

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

winning. Google is a bit on the ropes and is surprisingly vulnerable. Facebook and Apple have retrenched but have the resources to come back with a new push sometime over the next 12 to 24 months." Now, sir, I'll remind you that this is a document from 2017. Why did AppNexus consider Google on the ropes and vulnerable in 2017? Google was a direct competitor of AppNexus, and Google and AppNexus was directly competing on the ad server market. And the way Google approached the market and worked with the ad server customers not enabling the demand, as well as the supply outside, we, as a market leader -- and we thought it is -- this is how we'll push based on how Google and AppNexus was playing in the market on the publisher side, as well as the demand side. Okay. So to what extent, then, did AppNexus see an opportunity? Because publishers were looking for open, better monetization, and they were looking for optionality. So we built our own ad server and used that as an opportunity to help our publisher ecosystem. Now, this document also says that in 2017, Amazon is stealthy, aggressive, and winning. Why did AppNexus consider Amazon to be winning in

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

Amazon has the retail dollars and also launched 1 2 sponsored ads. So Amazon has both retail dollars, as well 3 as buyers. And their advertising grew from, if I remember, 4 like, 1 billion to 3 billion to -- you know, growing 5 aggressively. And Amazon was also taking the demand dollars 6 that would go to the open web into the closed Amazon 7 ecosystem. 8 And it's fair to say that, based on your testimony, that at this point Google and Amazon are considered 9 10 competitors, correct? 11 That is correct. 12 And this mentions Facebook and Apple. Are they also 13 considered competitors in 2017 in digital ads? 14 Facebookwise, yes. Amazon was entering into the 15 market -- sorry. Apple was entering into the market. 16 Are there any other competitors at this point in 2017 17 that you can think of? 18 On the buy-side, as I said before, Trade Desk. On the 19 sell-side, Magnite -- now it is Magnite; before that, it was 20 Rubicon, I believe -- and PubMatic, Index Exchange. There 21 were multiple competitors on the buy-side and sell-side. 22 If you look under the heading "State of AppNexus" --" 23 Yes, I see. 24 Do you see that?

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Uh-huh, yes.

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That is correct.

Read-In Deposition - B. John

The second-to-last bullet says, "Winning full-stack ad serving deals head-to-head against DFP and fueling the growth of header bidding to undermine AdX." Do you see that? Yes, I do. Α And this suggests that AppNexus believed it could win full-stack ad serving deals head-to-head against DFP, correct? Yes, we did. And you say, "yes, we did." You mean that at that time, AppNexus was winning full-stack ad serving deals head-to-head against DFP? Yes, that is correct. And what full-stack ad serving deals -- sorry. what full-stack ad serving deals was AppNexus winning head-to-head against DFP at this time in 2017? Axel Springer was one of our customers we migrated off Schipsted was another customer we migrated off of Google. Are there others that you can recall? Birda, Sky in Australia. Okay. And also in this bullet, it says, "Fueling the growth of header bidding to undermine AdX." AdX is Google's ad exchange, correct?

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1	Q And what does it mean when it says that "AppNexus is
2	working to undermine AdX"?
3	A So header bidding was our solution to empower the
4	publishers to make better monetization, and Google was
5	Google saw the down slow or slowdown after we launched
6	header bidding. So we wanted to leverage that growth to win
7	the deals against and leverage the optionality for our
8	customers for better monetization.
9	Q All right. Now, if you go to the second page
10	A Yes.
11	Q about a third of the way down the page, it says
12	"Partnership with AppNexus."
13	Do you see that?
14	A Yes, I do.
15	Q And am I right that this is talking about the
16	partnership between Microsoft and AppNexus?
17	A That is correct.
18	Q And it says, "Route all proprietary demand and O&O
19	supply through AppNexus to anchor an alternative
20	exchange/marketplace to Google and Facebook."
21	Do you see that?
22	A Yes, I do.
23	Q Now, what is meant by "proprietary demand"?
24	A All advertisers that come to Microsoft advertising
25	solutions to buy both O&O supply, as well as the third-party

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

1 supply, the demand advertising dollars comes through 2 Microsoft. That's the proprietary demand. 3 And it then says that "The partnership between 4 Microsoft and AppNexus is going to route that proprietary 5 demand and 0&0 supply through AppNexus." 6 And when it's talking about 0&0 supply, are those 7 the Microsoft O&Os we talked about early -- search, Bing 8 search, MSN, Outlook, Microsoft Edge, and the others that you mentioned? 10 Everything you said except the Bing search because 11 AppNexus is a nonsearch programmatic marketplace. But, yes, 12 MSN, Outlook, Skype, Xbox, all of those except search. 13 And you mentioned Xbox, which is gaming, obviously, 14 right? 15 That is correct. 16 Does Google have an analog to Xbox? 17 Not that I know of. 18 Now, to what extent are you aware that effective 19 February 2017, Microsoft entered into an exclusive agreement 20 with AppNexus where it agreed to route at least 95 percent 21 of its remnant inventory through AppNexus? 22 I was familiar with that. 23 Was the partnership between AppNexus and Microsoft a 24 strong success?

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Yes.

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Q To what extent, if at all, is it fair to say that the
Microsoft-AppNexus partnership made Microsoft a more
formidable competitor to the other companies that you
mentioned earlier?
A The partnership was very small in specific markets for
the sale side and also on programmatic. But this is in no
way comparable to the competition, like Facebook and Google
and Amazon, because they were running pretty much all of it
at a large scale. So it is not comparable.
Q In 2018, AT&T acquired AppNexus and rebranded it as
Xandr, correct?
A That is correct.
MS. DUNN: Your Honor, move to admit DTX 939.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MS. WOOD: No objection.
THE COURT: All right. It's in.
Q Do you have any reason to doubt that this is a document
prepared by Xandr in the normal course of business from
June 2020 given that it was produced to Google in response
to our document subpoena?
A I believe this is a Xandr document.
Q Now, I'll ask you to look at the executive summary at
the top of the page. The first bullet says, "AppNexus"
which you testified was later rebranded as Xandr "was
acquired for its end-to-end tech."

Read-In Deposition - B. John

1 Do you see that? 2 Yes, I do. What were the benefits of what this document refers to 3 4 as the linkage between buy and sell side? 5 When you run a marketplace, connecting the buyers and 6 sellers through the underlying same platform will yield 7 better results for advertisers, and that -- and avoid 8 errors. And those are the efficiencies when you run a 9 marketplace, both buy and sell in the same ecosystem. 10 And when you say that the linkage between buy and sell 11 side yields better results for advertisers, what 12 specifically are you talking about? 13 One, they can efficiently buy the supply with the right 14 way to match the audience because the audience data 15 underlying leverages both DSP and SSP underlying the same 16 infrastructure. 17 The second one is the reduction of errors. 18 The third one is you would be able to understand 19 what supply is available and sticky so that advertisers will 20 have much more visibility on what supply they can buy 21 through the same ecosystem. 22 And if you look at the next section, it says, 23 "Investment rational: DSP." 24 Do you see that? 25 Yes, I do.

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

And it says, "The one rational is to grow digital media spend and scale the marketplace." And it refers to 58 percent of the buy-side spend staying on the sell-side platform. Do you see that? Α Yes. Now, why does investing in the buy-side have the effect of scaling the Xandr marketplace? The advertising ecosystem starts with advertisers, right? So advertisers would want to reach. And they're the ones paying the money and paying the check. So you need to have the demand to fuel the ecosystem on the platform. Right. So if you invest in the buy-side and fuel the demand, that has the effect of scaling the rest of the marketplace. Is that what you're saying? That is one way to scale the platform because the demand is the key for scaling the marketplace. providing the better tools and better reporting and measurement technologies would enable the advertisers to use our platform. That is the -- that is one of the key investment thesis for investing in the DSP. And what specific benefits are there to publishers of keeping the buy-side spend on the platform and going to the sell-side?

So when publishers look at it, they're looking for

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

demand in a way that they can access through the ecosystem, and it's not just the only way to get that demand. Because, you know, you can see it's 58 percent invest; 42 percent comes from the other sources of the demand as well. But there are platforms that handle only supply-side and only buy-side. But having -- or reporting, for example -- right. So it's much easier for publishers to see how their inventory gets accessed, and they have the visibility end to end in a transparent way is one of the many -- or is one of the reasons publishers like this. And this investment helped us. And is Xandr competing with other companies that have buy and sell side integrated, as well as companies that just do the buy-side and just do the sell-side? Yes, we do both. And when you're scaling the marketplace, does that -to what extent does that help both buyers and sellers, so advertisers and publishers? As I said before, it helps the advertisers. One is the use of metrics because the audience that buyers bring in and the audience that the publishers have, it's in the same underlying platform and visibility and transparency. For a given dollar that advertisers use, they can see how that given dollar goes to different publishers and vice versa.

So those are the reasons and benefits for running the

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1	marketplace both sides.
2	Q And you talked about the benefits for the advertisers.
3	What about the benefits for the publishers of keeping the
4	invest spend the buy-side spend on the supply-side
5	platform?
б	A So the number one is the direct demand, right? So
7	they'll be able to get the demand directly and not wait for
8	external demand.
9	Also, there are product features, like deals and
10	programmatic guarantee. They'll be able to get a much
11	better packaging.
12	And there is another feature we call, like, to
13	inventory library. So they can package their inventory and
14	make it available to the buy-side customers.
15	And yeah, those are the publisher-side reasons.
16	Q And will the publishers make more money?
17	A Absolutely.
18	Q And I think you testified earlier that in December of
19	2021, Microsoft announced it was acquiring Xandr.
20	A That is correct.
21	Q And do you recall how much Microsoft paid for Xandr?
22	A I believe \$900 million.
23	MS. DUNN: Your Honor, move to admit DTX 1203.
24	THE COURT: Any objection?
25	MS. WOOD: No objection.

Read-In Deposition - B. John

1 THE COURT: All right. It's in. 2 And do you have any reason to doubt that this is a 3 document prepared by Microsoft in the ordinary course of 4 business? 5 No, I don't. This is a Microsoft document. 6 And so at this point, the board was informed that this 7 acquisition of Xandr would enable Microsoft to continue to 8 compete effectively; is that right? 9 That is correct. 10 And then it lists four things that Xandr would provide 11 Microsoft Advertising. Do you see that? 12 Α Yes, I do. 13 1. A globally deployed DSP that will expand Microsoft 14 data and demand across the open-web. 15 An SSP used by over 2,200 premium publishers 16 to manage and optimize advertising against their supply. 17 Strong video and connected TV assets and 18 investment; and 19 4. A media platform which enables advertisers, 20 publishers, and retail clients to buy and sell media in 21 secure marketplaces across the internet. 22 Do you see that? 23 Yes, I do. 24 And these were all things that the Microsoft board was 25 told it would acquire as assets with the Xandr acquisition,

Read-In Deposition - B. John

1 correct? 2 That is correct. And so at this point in 2021, the Microsoft board was 3 4 being told that this acquisition of Xandr would accelerate 5 Microsoft's growth and position Microsoft as a compelling 6 trusted alternative to competitors, right? 7 Yes, it is. But at this point, as you just said, there are multiple 8 9 competitors. Do you know how many at this point in 2021? 10 It's the same list that I mentioned before, Amazon, 11 Google, Facebook, Trade Desk, Magnite, PubMatic. And some 12 of them are also partners because they participate in the 13 ecosystem, if not most of them. 14 I'm asking whether you were aware or you believe 15 Microsoft was aware that other competitors were making 16 investments in ad tech. 17 I believe it's a public knowledge and announcements how 18 much advertising is critical for their competition. 19 they are publicly announcing those investments. 20 I don't want to put words in your mouth. Are you 21 saying it was public knowledge that these competitors were 22 investing in ad tech? 23 That is correct. 24 Okay. And you mentioned several companies, including

Amazon, Facebook, Google, Trade Desk, Magnite. What about

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

1 Yahoo? Was Yahoo a competitor as of December 2021? 2 Yahoo was a competitor, yes. 3 And what about FreeWheel? 4 FreeWheel was a computer also, yes. Α 5 0 And what about Index Exchange? 6 Α Index Exchange on the publisher side, yes. 7 Criteo? 0 8 Α Criteo was a competitor too. They are mostly focusing 9 on the targeting platform, but yes. 10 Anyone I haven't mentioned? 11 I'm sure there is plenty because the ecosystem has a 12 lot. So even these three I didn't mention before. I'm sure 13 there is plenty. 14 Now, I think before I mentioned in the document you brought with you, in 2021 it says, "Based on strong success, 15 16 Microsoft and Xandr renewed advertising sales and service 17 agreement through FY 26." 18 Do you see that? 19 Yes. 20 And so "we," is this referring to the strong success 21 that Microsoft and Xandr had even up until 2021? 22 That is correct. 23 Now, in 2019, Microsoft acquired something called 24 PromoteIQ.

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That is correct.

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

1 What is PromoteIQ? 2 PromoteIQ is a retail media ad platform that 3 facilitates buy and sell for the retail brands. They can 4 buy -- brands can buy targeted advertising on the retail 5 brand websites. 6 And does Google have anything like PromoteIQ? 7 Not that I'm aware of. 8 But advertisers through Microsoft can buy through 9 PromoteIQ? 10 That is correct. 11 And so is it accurate that in 2021 Microsoft introduced 12 Microsoft audience ads which would help search advertisers 13 get additional high-quality ad traffic from nonsearch 14 placements? 15 That is correct. 16 And just so I make sure I understand this, those are 17 the same advertisers who sometimes advertise on search are 18 now advertising in nonsearch placements, right? 19 Yes, it is. 20 To what extent, if at all, are you aware that following Microsoft's acquisition of Xandr, Microsoft won a bid to 21 22 become Netflix's ad tech provider? 23 I'm very familiar. 24 MS. DUNN: Your Honor, move to admit 1367.

No objection.

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MS. WOOD:

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

THE COURT: All right. It's in. This is a document that has been produced to us by Microsoft, and it concerns the agreement between Microsoft and Netflix. Do you see that? Α Yes, I do. And what role, if any, did Microsoft's ownership of Xandr play in persuading Netflix to sign with Microsoft? Xandr brought the technology for video, both buy and sell side. That was one of the critical elements for Netflix to choose Microsoft. And to what extent, if at all, was this Netflix agreement a big deal for Microsoft? It is a big deal. Why is that? Because Netflix is one of the premium publishers, and Netflix is launching advertisement for the first time. Netflix has a good target audience that advertisers are looking to reach. What are halo effects? It is a public acknowledgment that Xandr has a leading CTV market -- marketplace. A premium publisher like Netflix can leverage the technology, and publishers are looking for open-web. And the reason that Netflix chose Microsoft and Xandr is now going to be publicly known, and that will bring additional value and additional opportunities for Microsoft.

1 When you say "open-web," what do you mean? 2 Meaning taking the demand and openly making it 3 available for all publishers. 4 And what halo effects of the Netflix acquisition were 5 being seen in connected TV? 6 As I said, it's about these companies mentioned here. 7 They'll be able to leverage the technology that Xandr built 8 for CTV. So that's the halo effect. 9 And when you say the companies mentioned here --10 MS. DUNN: And then don't read the sealed line. 11 And so because of the Netflix acquisition, those 12 companies will be able to advertise through Microsoft on connected TV? 13 14 That is correct. 15 MS. DUNN: Company named sealed. 16 Out for more engagement on advertising solutions. Do 17 you see that? 18 That is correct, yes. 19 So it's fair to say that on the buy-side, the halo 20 effect of Netflix was resulting in outreach by all of those 21 companies? 22 That is correct. 23 And I just want to make clear for the record that 24 whether -- the extent to which you agree that all of the 25 things that we've discussed -- the work with Yahoo,

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

PromoteIQ, the Xandr acquisition, the Netflix advertising agreement, and all of these halo effects that we just discussed -- were already being discussed prior to the filing of the DOJ's lawsuit in 2023. Α That is correct. MS. DUNN: Your Honor, move to admit DTX 1755. THE COURT: 1755, any objection? MS. WOOD: No objection. THE COURT: All right. It's in. Mr. John, I think you just testified to this, but is what you just drew an accurate depiction of the Microsoft Advertising ecosystem? As of today, correct. MS. DUNN: Your Honor, I don't want to take it down if you're not ready, but the next questions don't deal with this. So I'll just leave it up for, like, 30 seconds. MS. WOOD: It's in the binder, Your Honor. in the record. THE COURT: That's fine. We'll look at it down the road. And have you ever heard the phrase "bid shading"? Yes, I do. And what is bid shading? Bid shading is when a buyer bids for a specific dollar amount, let's say \$10, and second-price auction, let's say,

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

two bid comes, \$10 and \$9. The \$9 would be the winning bid if you used the second-price auction. If you used the first-price auction, \$10 would be the first winning bid. And it sounds good from a publisher point of view, the \$10. But from advertisers' point of view, it's also good because they'll reach the right audience. They're willing to pay more. But it also depletes the budgets very quickly. So there is a balance based on the optimized value for the inventory and how much the advertisers can pay. You adjust the price between first price and second price, and that adjustment is through algorithms. That is called bid shading. And it sounds like what you're saying is that bid shading is not just good for advertisers; it's also good for publishers? That is correct. And just to be specific, why is bid shading good for advertisers in your opinion? Because they can use -- they can use the savings to reach more and buy more inventory. On the publisher side now, it sounds like they'll get more money to begin with, but the budget dollars will be depleted more. So they'll get longer -- they'll get -- they'll be able to optimize further along in budget dollars.

And to what extent, if at all, is bid shading good for

- 1 publishers? 2 Because publishers -- advertisers will spend more if 3 they have more budget dollars. So they will probably get --4 they will get more budget dollars in the long run for the 5 same inventory. 6 What is Xandr's bid shading feature called? 7 It's bid shading. Α Okay. Is it -- is it called bid price optimization? 8 9 It's an algorithm called BP, or bid price optimization, 10 correct. 11 Understood. And to what extent, if at all, are you 12 aware that besides Microsoft and Google, other companies have bid shading features? 13
- 14 A Trade Desk has bid shading features as well.
- Q What, if anything, distinguishes Trade Desk's bid shading feature from the bid shading feature of Microsoft and Google?
- A Its algorithm is different. It's individual
 algorithms. But the key difference is Trade Desk charges
 for it, and we don't charge for it.
 - Q Mr. John, you just testified that prior to the DOJ filing its lawsuit, it was publicly known that Microsoft had access to first-party data, right?
- 24 | A Its own first-party data.

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25 | 0 Its own first-party data?

1 Access to -- can you clarify who has access to what? 2 That advertisers advertising through Microsoft tools 3 had access to Microsoft's own first-party data? 4 That's launched only recently, two weeks ago. Α 5 And it was publicly known that Xandr had that 6 capability? 7 That is correct. 8 And also before the government filed its complaint, it 9 was known that Xandr brought to Microsoft buy-side tools, 10 sell-side tools, and an exchange, correct? 11 That is correct. 12 And also prior to the government filing its complaint, 13 it was publicly known that Microsoft had AI technology, 14 right? 15 That's correct. 16 And also prior to the government filing its complaint, 17 it was publicly known that Microsoft had Xbox, correct? 18 That is correct. 19 And that it was trying to acquire Activision Blizzard. 20 Α I don't remember the dates but --21 That's publicly known, right? 22 Yes. 23 And that it had won this exclusive arrangement with 24 Netflix, correct?

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That is correct.

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Q And that it had this had acquired PromoteIQ, which		
gave advertisers access to retail, correct?		
A That is correct.		
MS. DUNN: Your Honor, I'll give the Court a		
minute to read the next portion, which is sealed.		
THE COURT: Thank you.		
Q When a publisher uses Xandr's publisher ad server and		
mediation to access AdX demand, who bids first and who bids		
second?		
A Xandr bids first, and we check with Google whether they		
have a higher bid. Then we make a decision.		
Q And who bids last when a publisher uses Xandr's		
publisher ad server in conjunction with mediation?		
A Google, and it's also the configuration of the line		
item. It is something you can do.		
Q Is it ideal for Xandr to have to use a mediation system		
in which Google has a last look?		
A It is not ideal. The reason we are doing that based		
on the feedback that we need to get access to the Google		
demand, we are doing that.		
Q Why is it not ideal for Google to have a last look when		
a publisher uses Xandr's publisher ad server and mediation?		
A A couple of reasons. One, as a publisher, they have to		
manage two accounts, and they have to pay both the fee to		
Xandr as well as to Google. And they are managing multiple		

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line items, one for Xandr and one for Google. Both operationally it's expensive, as well as when it comes to the performance, it's also expensive. The third one is they're not getting all of the demand even through mediation; so it's kind of a patch. Why is when Xandr's publisher ad server connects through mediation and that gets AdX last look, why is that not ideal from Xandr's perspective? Google can override a penny and just win the bid. And why is that not ideal from Xandr's perspective? Because you can win the bid, and it's -- and you're not giving an opportunity for other bidders. A few minutes ago I think you mentioned that Xandr recently lost a client to Google's publisher ad server and that client was using mediation. Do you remember that? That is correct. Which client was that? Sorry. Oops, okay. Okay. Sorry. Switzerland specifically. Α Say the last thing again. It was Switzerland. Okay. What's your understanding of why -- company name -- switched from Xandr's publisher ad server to Google's publisher ad server?

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It's specifically the AdX demand that they were not -that they were losing, and they were able to get that demand when they migrated to Google. I think you mentioned that when a publisher uses Xandr's mediation system, the publisher does not get the full AdX demand? That is correct. Why is that? Because that is my understanding when Google prioritizes the demand or gets the demand through both AdWords or DV360. Google ad server customers, when they manage the line items when they run, they get the priority on the demand. Who are Xandr's main competitors for publisher ad serving for display? For display, it's Google ad server. Why do you say that Google's ad server is Xandr's main competitor for publisher ad serving for display? Google has been -- it started with the DoubleClick acquisition, and Google has been investing heavily in the product and also activating all the publishers, both small-scale, as well as large-scale publishers globally. So they have an ad server footprint with the customers globally.

Is Facebook a competitor for Xandr's publisher ad

1 server and the publisher ad server business for display? 2 No, they're not. 3 Is Apple a competitor for Xandr's publisher ad server, 4 publisher ad server business for display? 5 No, they're not. 6 Is Amazon a competitor for Xandr's publisher ad server 7 and the publisher ad server business for display? 8 Α They have an SSP, but I haven't seen Amazon selling ad 9 servers the same way that Google and Xandr are selling. 10 So earlier counsel for Google asked you questions about 11 Xandr competing with Facebook, Amazon, Apple, and Amazon. 12 Do you remember that? 13 Yes, I do. 14 Are Facebook, Apple, and Amazon competitors in the publisher ad server business for display? 15 16 No. They are on the buy-side customers' competitors 17 because advertisers go to Facebook or Google or Apple or 18 Amazon, and we all compete for the same advertising dollars. 19 That's what I meant. 20 Focusing on the display of publisher ad server business 21 specifically, are Facebook, Apple, and Amazon competitors 22 for Xandr's publisher ad server? 23 No. 24 Who are Xandr's main competitors in the display

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exchange business?

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1 When you say "exchange," I'm assuming you're referring 2 to the SSP or the ad server because if it's ad server, it's 3 Google. If it's exchange or SSPs, it's Magnite, Publica, 4 Index Ex -- sorry -- Index Exchange and PubMatic. 5 Can you just repeat the names, the list of competitors? 6 Magnite, PubMatic, Index Exchange. 7 Okay. 0 8 They're the major exchange competitors. 9 Q Okay. So what I think what you said was Xandr's -- for 10 publisher ad serving, Xandr's main competitor is Google? 11 For display advertising. 12 Q For display? 13 Correct. 14 And for SSPs, does Xandr's main SSP competitors include 15 Google's AdX? 16 That's correct. 17 So for SSPs, Xandr's main competitors are for display 18 Google AdX, Magnite, PubMatic, and Index; is that right? That is correct. 19 20 Is Facebook a competitor for Xandr's SSP for display? 21 No. 22 Is Apple a competitor for Xandr's SSP for display? 23 No. 24 Is Amazon a competitor for Xandr for display?

SSP -- they have a TAM or the hybrid -- sorry -- header

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1 bid equivalent, yes. Does Amazon have an SSP that third parties can access? 2 3 I believe so. 4 A minute ago you listed -- when you listed Xandr's main Q 5 competitors for SSP, you did not include Amazon. 6 Yeah. 7 Did you do that on purpose, or did you forget? 0 8 Α I missed that. 9 Q Who is Xandr's biggest competitor for display SSPs? 10 It's Magnite, Index Exchange, PubMatic, Amazon, yeah. 11 In the past ten years, how many major U.S. publishers 12 has Xandr tried to convince to switch from Google for 13 publisher ad serving to Xandr for publisher ad serving for 14 display? 15 Multiple. And from a product feature perspective, we 16 meet the requirements of all the RFPs and customers. 17 then when it comes to either -- the both -- the migration 18 costs and the loss of demand, customers back off. 19 Can you list specific publishers, U.S. publishers? 20 the last ten years, how easy or difficult has it been for 21 Xandr, as a publisher ad server, to compete with Google's 22 publisher ad server for display in the U.S.? 23 It's very difficult. We're not able to penetrate or 24 migrate any large publishers in the U.S. even though, you 25 know, we are headquartered here. We have teams and

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that publishers would miss.

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engineers and sales force here. Europe is not our headquarters, but we have our teams. It's very hard. How would you characterize Google's position in the publisher ad server business in the U.S.? They're the leading market player, and almost all publishers use Google ad server. Sure. What impact, if any, is there on competition from the fact that Google demand is now fully available to publishers unless the publishers use DFP -- Google DFP as their publisher ad server? So the impact will be there will not be any other ad server other than Google. And Google will have the say in how much or how publishers can monetize or get the better yield. And that is -- and that will be the impact. If the display publisher ad server business were more competitive, would that be bad or good for publishers? It's absolutely good for publishers. Why would it be absolutely good for publishers if the display publisher ad server business were to be more competitive? They have an opportunity. They run the RFPs. time they have an opportunity to migrate and it's better monetization, not when they're locked down, and ability to try other features. So that's -- yeah, those are the things

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Is it fair to say that Google's publisher ad server has been successful in the display publisher ad server business? Based on the market leading and based on the market presentation, yes. Is Google's publisher ad server success due to Google competing fairly on the merits and having the best product? Based on what I hear and see, the documentation, Google don't have the best product. They invest a lot in the But as I said, product is not the only reason product. customers or publishers stay with or work with Google ad server. It's the demand and stickiness. When Xandr is the publisher ad server for a publisher, does Xandr prevent the publisher from using different price floors for different exchanges? No, we did not. Why not? We give the controls to the publisher, how they want to set the price, and that's the price we use for the bidding auction. Why did Xandr allow publishers to set different price floors for different exchanges? Depending upon the placements and the type of inventory, they'll be able to manage the floor prices. it is a feature that we give them full control how they manage it.

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Read-In Deposition - B. John

What benefits, if any, result to publishers from Xandr allowing publishers to set different price floors for different exchanges? So they are -- they can -- they know the inventory better. They know their audience better. Based on how they predict their page views and the seasonality and the types of uses and audience and timing, they can have different flow-through. It's all about powering the publishers so they can monetize their content better. One of the things that I think you said was customers are attracted to the scale marketplace. Α That is correct. What do you mean by that? So when customers are looking for the growth and the publisher community looks for the monetization, the advertiser community looks for ROAS, return on ad spend. They look for the marketplace liquidity and growth. that's where, you know, they would like to get the value that they're looking for, and it's a network effect. When you run a marketplace that brings the overall good, it's like -- brings the virtuous cycle. So a second ago you used the word "network effect." What did you mean by that? So when you bring the demand, the demand looks for the supply. But the demand or the advertiser is not looking for

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one supply; they're looking for multiple types of supply where the audience are. It's like the diverse audience or the customers are on different platforms. So you need to have a diverse set of publishers, of inventory, of format, and that's what you need. And these players would only come if they have also a diverse set of demands. They don't want only one specific type of demand come to their publisher property. So it's like you need to have a dynamic nature of advertising dollars, and you need to have a dynamic nature -- a diverse nature of the inventory of publishers as well. And when you bring them, it brings the network effect that grows. So why does the display SSP business have a winner-take-most dynamic? Because when it comes to an SSP, you are operating on a model that publishers are -- the winning bid will be based on multiple facts and you are not the only one. So there are multiple partners when you use header bidding and when you use waterfall technologies. And then you have to have the sophisticated algorithms, and you have to bring the demand. And all of those brings -- to make sure your publisher connection wins the auction. What connection, if any, is there between the

winner-take-most dynamic for SSPs for display and the

1 sophisticated algorithms that you described? 2 That is one part of it. And the more the publisher 3 wins, the algorithm learns and gets optimized. And that's 4 where -- you know, that's how machine learning algorithms 5 work. It gets a sample set. It feeds to itself, and it 6 improves by itself. And if we get the more supply and if we 7 make the supply algorithms learn the supply, we'll be able to make supply wins and monetize better. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. I think it's getting close 10 enough to the end of the day that we should close this down. 11 I would think we'll start Monday morning. There's not much 12 left, and that's what we'll do. 13 And then, after that, is it still your plan to 14 call -- is Marco Hardie a person or a deposition? 15 MS. DUNN: Marco Hardie is a person; although, I 16 think we will -- let me just confer with Ms. Rhee because I 17 think we may have a different witness for first thing in the 18 morning. 19 THE COURT: All right. 20 (Counsel confer.) 21 MS. DUNN: Okay. Mr. Hardie lives locally, and 22 our other witness lives not in town. So we are going to 23 call Mr. Korula after we finish with the Microsoft read-in. 24 THE COURT: All right. And just so I have a sense 25 for manpower purposes of Monday, besides this read-in, is

1	there any other read-in that's being scheduled for Monday?
2	MS. DUNN: Yeah. So Mr. Korula is likely not to
3	be a short witness. And so the answer to Your Honor's
4	question depends, in part, on plaintiffs' cross. If we
5	finish early enough, there are live witnesses we would
6	prefer to put on, but we need to look at the timing of
7	everything.
8	THE COURT: No. I'm sorry. Do you anticipate
9	calling anybody by deposition Monday?
10	MS. DUNN: Probably not, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: Okay. That's what I need to know at
12	this point. All right.
13	So, again, there's nothing happening before. So
14	you can leave your tables if you are comfortable doing that.
15	We'll start Monday at 9:00. Make sure you have your list of
16	witnesses in order that each side has.
17	And we'll now read the exhibits that we think were
18	entered into evidence today for the record.
19	You all set?
20	MS. WOOD: Yes, Your Honor.
21	MS. DUNN: Yes.
22	THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: DTX 1898, DTX 1420, PTX
23	1249, PTX 1237 and 1237A, PTX 1260 and 1260A, DTX 868, DTX
24	1920, DTX 1922, PTX 1459, PTX 1461, PTX 1280, PTX 1384, PTX
25	1279, PTX 1262 and 1262A, PTX 1239 and 1239A, PTX 1277 and

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1277A, PTX 1236 and 1236A, PTX 1281 and 1281A, PTX 1435 and 1435A, PTX 1388 and PTX 1388A, PTX 580, PTX 1392, PTX 1092, PTX 1093, PTX 1096, PTX 1099, DTX 1511, DTX 173, DTX 506, PTX 764, DTX 7, DTX 847, DTX 1129, DTX 379, DTX 939; DTX 1203, DTX 1367, and DTX 1755. (Counsel confer.) THE COURT: Defendant's 1420, there were only specific pages we were going to take from that. Do you remember? MS. DUNN: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I couldn't hear. THE COURT: Defense Exhibit 1420. MS. DUNN: I don't -- I do not see that on my I have 1444 that I have written down but didn't hear, but not 1420. MS. WOOD: For which witness? Do we know? THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: It was cross for Mr. Lee. MS. WOOD: I don't have 1420. MS. DUNN: It's the Criteo 10K, I'm told. MS. WOOD: So that was not admitted. THE COURT: We chose not to finally admit it. That's fine. I know we had talked about just one or two pages from it, but if it was not formally admitted, then it's not in. All right.

MS. DUNN: The pages were admitted.

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THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: I thought it was only two
       I wrote down 12 and 13. It wanted to make sure.
          THE COURT: I think that is actually --
         MS. WOOD:
                    Okay.
         THE COURT: Just those two pages. All right.
                                                        So
when we clean up the record, we have to make sure that's
done correctly. Okay?
         MS. DUNN: I also have written down DTX 1444.
         MS. WOOD:
                    Is it PTX? I have PTX 1444.
         MS. DUNN:
                    Okay.
         THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: I have that from yesterday.
         MS. WOOD:
                    From yesterday, exactly.
         MS. DUNN:
                    Okay. Great.
         MS. WOOD:
                    I also have DTX 1922 right after DTX
1920.
          THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Oh, I have that too. I
thought I said that one.
          MS. WOOD: Maybe you did and I missed it. Okay.
         THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: I have that one. I have
that.
         MR. ISAACSON: I have an extremely minor point.
For DTX 1420, we should admit the first page to show it's
the 10K.
         THE COURT: We should probably have that, yes.
pages 1, 2, and 13 of Defense Exhibit 1420 are the only ones
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1	that go into the record. Again, the thumb drive or whatever
2	you've got at some point has to be fixed.
3	Anything else?
4	MS. WOOD: Nothing, Your Honor.
5	MS. DUNN: Nothing, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: All right. You all have done a good
7	job, and I'm pleased the case is moving.
8	So have a good weekend, stay safe and healthy.
9	Wear your masks if you're in public.
10	We'll see you at 9:00 Monday morning.
11	MS. WOOD: Thank you, Your Honor.
12	MS. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor.
13	(Proceedings adjourned at 5:57 p.m.)
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22	I certify that the foregoing is a true and
23	accurate transcription of my stenographic notes.
24	/s/
25	Rhonda F. Montgomery, CCR, RPR